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Abstract 
This Article examines the recent phenomenon of the convergence of competition law 
regimes across the globe. The increasing harmonization of competition law, at both the 
procedural and substantive levels, has been widely discussed and applauded in recent years. This 
Article casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that convergence necessarily constitutes a positive 
development in global competition law. After analyzing the causes of the phenomenon, this 
Article argues that there should be limits to the pursuit of convergence. First, the costs of 
convergence should not be overlooked. The most important of such costs is the loss of national 
regulatory prerogative. Second, the multitude of goals that are pursued by different jurisdictions 
in their competition laws poses serious obstacles to convergence. Finally, the need to incorporate 
economic development considerations and cultural variations in market behavior further 
cautions against wholesale harmonization of competition laws. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
If there is one most important development in international competition 
law in recent years, it is convergence. With the proliferation of competition law 
regimes in the last three decades, there has been increasing concern about 
inconsistent enforcement and consequently a drive to harmonize competition 
law globally. Led by established jurisdictions, most notably the US and the EU, 
and a host of international organizations, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International 
Competition Network (ICN), proponents of convergence have attempted to 
build a consensus on various aspects of competition law and encouraged other 
jurisdictions to converge on these so-called international best practices.1 These 
best practices are encapsulated in the form of guidelines, recommendations, and 
discussion papers. The expectation is that the emerging jurisdictions will 
incorporate these practices and converge toward the approaches to competition 
law of the established jurisdictions. 
                                                 
1  There are no formal definitions of “established” and “emerging” jurisdictions. The two 
indisputably established jurisdictions in competition law are the US and the EU. OECD member 
states are generally also considered established jurisdictions to varying degrees. Emerging 
jurisdictions are those countries that adopted competition law relatively recently—over the last 
decade or two—or those that only stepped up enforcement recently after years of inactivity. 
Examples include India, China, and most developing countries. 
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What distinguishes convergence in competition law from attempts at 
harmonization in other areas of law is the voluntary nature of the enterprise and 
the lack of formal, binding international treaties. With the abandonment of the 
Singapore agenda in the World Trade Organization (WTO),2 it seems that the 
international competition community has decided to eschew formal 
harmonization through international treaties and has instead focused its efforts 
on voluntary convergence. The established jurisdictions and the international 
organizations make no explicit attempt to compel or pressure other jurisdictions 
to conform to the international best practices. Instead, these other jurisdictions 
are left to decide on their own whether and to what extent they will align their 
domestic regimes with the international consensus. Convergence can be said to 
be a form of informal harmonization, while the pursuit of a binding international 
treaty is more appropriately described as formal harmonization. Harmonization 
in competition law is distinctly informal in nature. 
The general view is that convergence benefits the global competition law 
community by reducing cross-jurisdictional divergences and minimizing 
instances of inconsistent enforcement. At first blush, the logic of harmonization 
seems irresistible. With the internationalization of markets and the expanding 
reach of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs), the regulation of markets needs 
to be globalized as well. A uniform set of rules should apply to business conduct 
by a firm operating in multiple jurisdictions. Conventional wisdom holds that 
this would reduce compliance costs and facilitate cross-border transactions. This 
Article seeks to demonstrate the need to question and qualify this logic. There 
are, in fact, a number of important reasons why the case for convergence may 
have been overstated and why regulatory diversity across jurisdictions should be 
preserved. 
This Article is divided into seven sections. Section I has introduced the 
basic premise of the Article. Section II provides an overview of the proliferation 
of competition law and the phenomenon of convergence. Section III examines 
in greater detail the key actors and mechanisms of convergence and briefly 
explains the reasons for its success thus far. Section IV delves into the costs and 
benefits of convergence and casts doubt on the prevailing wisdom that 
harmonization of competition law is a universally positive development. Section 
                                                 
2  See generally Martin Khor, The “Singapore Issues” in the WTO: Evolution and Implications for Developing 
Countries, 33 TWN Trade and Dev Ser 1 (2007). The “Singapore issues” refer to four permanent 
working groups on transparency in government procurement, trade facilitation, trade and 
investment, and trade and competition. At the fifth Doha Ministerial at Cancun in 2003, 
persistent deadlock led to three of the issues’ being dropped in order to refocus negotiations on 
trade facilitation. The issues were officially abandoned by the August 1, 2004, decision of the 
General Council (The July Package). See World Trade Organization (WTO), Decision Adopted by the 
General Council on 1 August 2004 ¶ 1(g), WTO Doc No WT/L/579 (Aug 2, 2004). 
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V focuses on the disagreement concerning the policy goals and some key 
concepts in competition law and examines its implications for convergence. 
Section VI surveys a number of economic and socio-political characteristics of 
developing countries and proposes possible accommodations of these 
characteristics in competition law. Section VII suggests that competition law 
principles and enforcement need to incorporate cultural considerations, which 
provide a further reason for divergences. Section VIII concludes the Article. 
II.  PROLIFERATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND THE DRIVE 
FOR CONVERGENCE 
Competition law promotes free competition by prohibiting anti-
competitive conduct by firms.3 Competition law has proliferated across the 
globe in recent years. Fewer than thirty jurisdictions had competition law thirty 
years ago.4 In many of those thirty jurisdictions, enforcement was far from 
active.5 By early 2011, it is estimated that more than 110 jurisdictions had 
adopted competition law.6 In conjunction with this rapid proliferation of 
competition law has been a push for convergence. Both at the national and the 
international levels, concerns have arisen about the growth in the number of 
competition law regimes and potentially inconsistent enforcement.7 Until about 
fifteen years ago, the US and the EU were the only two jurisdictions in the world 
that mattered to the operation of multinational corporations. Due to factors 
both related and unrelated to competition law, the dynamics have shifted and a 
number of new key players have emerged. 
Since the late 1990s, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has begun 
to direct its attention to foreign companies, including Microsoft, Intel, and 
                                                 
3  See Martyn D. Taylor, International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO 1 (Cambridge 
2006). 
4  See Brendan Sweeney, International Competition Law and Policy: A Work in Progress, 10 Melb J Intl L 
58, 58 (2009). 
5  For example, competition law enforcement was de-emphasized in Japan for decades until the 
1990s. See David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization 211–13 (Oxford 
2010); Masako Wakui, Antimonopoly Law: Competition Law and Policy in Japan 16–36 (Arima 2008). 
6  See Sweeney, 10 Melb J Intl L at 58 (cited in note 4). 
7  See Jane E. Willis and Matthew P. Garvey, Promoting Convergence on Anti-Monopoly Standards (Law 
360 Sept 30, 2008), online at http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/8c9e440a-f59a-46be-
be1f-1a788d0d984c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/ed1011df-73d8-4fd9-b1fc-
23f8eb636450/Law360.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011); Tefft Smith and Catherine Fazio, Convergence: A 
Call to Arms (Kirkland and Ellis 2003), online at 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/2492/Document1/Euromoney.pdf 
(visited Oct 24, 2011); James S. Venit, Modernization and Enforcement – The Need for Convergence: On 
Procedure and Substance, European Competition Law Annual 2006: Enforcement of Prohibition of 
Cartels (Hart 2006). 
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Qualcomm, in its enforcement activities.8 In the 1990s, the Japan Fair Trade 
Commission (JFTC) also became more active in enforcing the Japanese Anti-
Monopoly Act.9 The emergence of the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, 
India and China), especially China and India, as global economic powerhouses 
following the financial crisis of 2008 has propelled these countries’ competition 
law regimes to the forefront of the global competition community. The People’s 
Republic of China’s (PRC) Anti-Monopoly Law has attracted intense scrutiny 
since it was promulgated in 2007 and came into effect in August 2008.10 
Meanwhile, India’s competition law regime has been revamped in recent years. A 
new statute, the Competition Act, was passed and a new agency set up to 
rejuvenate competition law enforcement in the country.11 With the global 
competition community shifting from a bipolar to a multi-polar world, there is 
increasing concern that the growing number of jurisdictions will enforce their 
competition laws inconsistently, raising the compliance costs to MNCs operating 
in multiple jurisdictions. 
This anxiety is by no means unfounded. From the mid-1990s onward, the 
generally harmonious relationship between US and EU competition authorities 
                                                 
8  See Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), 2006 Annual Report **21–26, online at 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=53&pageId=0301 (visited Oct 24, 
2011); KFTC, 2009 Annual Report **45–49, online at 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=53&pageId=0301 (visited Oct 24, 
2011); KFTC, 2010 Annual Report **49–53, online at 
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/bbs.do?command=getList&type_cd=53&pageId=0301(visited Oct 24, 
2011). 
9  Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No 54 of 1947 
(Japan). See Gerber, Global Competition at 213–15 (cited note 5); Wakui, Antimonopoly Law at 31–38 
(cited in note 5). This shift in attitude was partly due to pressure by the US, which had 
complained for years that lax enforcement of competition law had allowed Japanese firms to erect 
entry barriers against American firms. It was also partly due to the realization, after the burst of 
the economic bubble in the late-1980s, that the economic model that had allowed Japan to attain 
phenomenal growth after the Second World War, which had de-emphasized domestic 
competition, no longer sufficed. Japan must turn to competition to inject vitality into its 
moribund economy. See Wakui, Antimonopoly Law at 30–38. 
10  One reflection of the amount of attention on the Anti-Monopoly Law is the fact that the 
Antitrust Law Journal published by the American Bar Association (ABA) devoted one full issue 
to it. See 75 Antitrust L J 1 (2008). The overriding concern has been that the Chinese (PRC) 
government will use competition law for protectionist purposes as opposed to for promoting 
domestic competition. This concern was not assuaged by the Ministry of Commerce’s rejection of 
Coca-Cola’s acquisition of Huiyuan, a major Chinese fruit juice and beverage company, in 2008. 
See Stephanie Wong and Wing-gar Cheng, China Blocks Coca-Cola’s $2.3 Billion Huiyuan Bid 
(Update2) (Bloomberg Mar 18, 2009), online at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=awHnS1HJ2Usw (visited Nov 
10, 2011). 
11  See generally Aditya Bhattacharjea, India’s New Competition Law: A Comparative Assessment, 4 J 
Competition L & Econ 609 (2008). 
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has been repeatedly marred by disputes, mostly in the form of US complaints 
about EU enforcement activity against American corporations. These disputes, 
including the GE-Honeywell merger and the European Commission’s action 
against Microsoft, have at times assumed an acrimonious tone, with the US 
officials accusing the European Commission of misapplying competition law 
principles to the detriment of effective competition.12 If two mature jurisdictions 
at relatively similar stages of economic development and with similar 
conceptions of competition cannot avoid serious confrontations with each 
other, one may justifiably despair about the prospect of cooperation in a multi-
polar global community. Convergence is an attempt to forestall future conflicts. 
The criticisms of the EU by the US officials and commentators betray the 
Americans’ presumption that there exists a set of universally applicable 
competition law principles.13 If the EU officials had applied these principles 
correctly, the Americans argue, they would have reached the same results as their 
American counterparts. It is this notion of the universality of competition law 
that has propelled the recent drive for convergence. This notion is premised on 
the existence of a common set of principles to which jurisdictions converge, and 
the belief that these principles are flexible enough to be adapted to countries 
under disparate socio-economic circumstances. These principles are built upon 
modern industrial organization economics, and are mainly informed by US and 
EU experiences. Thus, while the drive for convergence is motivated by a desire 
to minimize cross-jurisdictional conflicts, the theoretical foundation is built 
upon the notion of the universality of competition law. 
III.  A  CLOSER LOOK AT CONVERGENCE 
A.  Different Levels of Convergence  
Convergence of competition law can take place at procedural, substantive, 
and normative levels. Procedural convergence refers to the harmonization of 
procedural rules that apply in competition cases. The only area of competition 
                                                 
12  See Gerber, Global Competition at 95–98 (cited in note 5); Deborah Platt Majoras, GE-Honeywell: The 
U.S. Decision, Remarks Before the Antitrust Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia **13–17 (Nov 29, 
2001), online at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/9893.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011); 
Thomas O. Barnett, Statement on European Microsoft Decision (Dept of Justice Sept 17, 2007), online 
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2007/226070.htm (visited Oct 24, 2011). 
13  See, for example, William J. Kolasky, Conglomerate Mergers and Range Effects: It is a Long Way from 
Chicago to Brussels, 10 Geo Mason U L Rev 533 (2002); John R. Wilke, US Antitrust Chief Criticizes 
EU Decision to Reject Merger of GE and Honeywell, Wall St J A3 (July 5, 2001) (quoting Assistant 
Attorney General Charles James: “Clear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the 
antitrust laws protect competition, not competitors . . . . [The EU decision] reflects a significant 
point of divergence”). 
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law that has witnessed significant international procedural convergence is merger 
review.14 In other areas of competition law, the applicable procedural rules tend 
to follow the general civil and criminal procedural laws of the presiding 
jurisdiction. There has been no attempt to harmonize them, apart from the 
insistence on basic procedural fairness. 
Substantive convergence refers to the harmonization of substantive 
competition law principles, in other words, the standard for the legality of 
various modes of business conduct. Substantive convergence is the main focus 
of most convergence efforts. It is beneficial to firms because it provides 
uniformity of legal rules, thereby lowering their regulatory compliance costs. It 
can take place at the administrative level by way of guidelines and policy 
statements. This will be referred to as administrative substantive convergence in 
the remainder of this Article. It can also take place at the judicial level through 
court decisions. This will be referred to as judicial substantive convergence. 
While administrative substantive convergence is relatively well understood, 
judicial substantive convergence has received less attention from commentators 
and officials. Domestic courts do refer to the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions 
when confronted with a novel issue. The High Court of Australia routinely 
refers to cases from other jurisdictions. One example is Queensland Wire Industries 
v Broken Hill Proprietary,15 which concerned a refusal to supply. In its discussion 
of market definition, the lead opinion of this Australian High Court case 
referred to the EU cases of Hoffman-La Roche16 and United Brands,17 the US 
Second Circuit Alcoa case,18 and the US Supreme Court cases of Grinnell19 and 
American Tobacco.20 In his discussion of the definition of exclusionary conduct, 
Judge Dawson discussed United Shoe Machinery Corp21 and Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen 
Highlands Skiing Corp.22 In Cancun Trading No 24 CC and Others and Seven-Eleven 
                                                 
14  The timeline for the merger review process of a number of jurisdictions, such as China, has 
aligned with the EU model. See Anti-Monopoly Law of People’s Republic of China, Arts 25–26 
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on Aug 30, 2007 and 
effective Aug 1, 2008). 
15  167 CLR 177 (High Ct 1989) (Aus).  
16  Id at 188, citing Hoffman-La Roche & Co v Commission, 1 ECR 461 (1979). 
17  Id, citing United Brands v Commission, 1 ECR 207 (1978). 
18  Id at 189, citing United States v Aluminum Co of Am, 148 F2d 416, 425 (2d Cir 1945). 
19  Queensland at 189, citing United States v Grinnell Corp, 384 US 563, 571 (1966). 
20  Id, citing United States v Am Tobacco Co, 328 US 781 (1946). 
21  Id at 202, citing United States v United Shoe Machinery Corp, 110 F Supp 295, affd in 347 US 521 
(1954). 
22  Id, citing Aspen Skiing Co v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 US 585 (1985). 
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Corp (Pty) Ltd,23 the South African Competition Tribunal referred to the US cases 
of Socony-Vacuum Oil and Dr Miles24 and the EU case of Pronuptia v Schillgalis25 
when discussing the legality of resale price maintenance and a number of other 
restrictive practices in the franchise context. In Axiom Plastics Inc v EI Dupont 
Canada Co,26 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice discussed the US Supreme 
Court case Hanover Shoe v United Shoe Machinery Corp27 and the Third Circuit case 
In re Linerboard when addressing the issue of the “passing on” defense to direct 
purchaser claims.28 The EU courts have also discussed relevant US case law on a 
number of occasions. The European Court of Justice did so in Tetra Pak 
International SA v Commission,29 for instance, when it was asked to decide whether 
a predatory pricing claim requires proof of the likelihood of recoupment of 
losses under EU law.30 
Normative convergence focuses on the alignment of cultural norms 
regarding competition. These norms may, and in fact do, vary widely across the 
globe. Arguing against a globally centralized competition law regime, Professor 
Oliver Budzinski observes that citizens of different jurisdictions “can have 
diverging majority preferences about elementary competition policy 
characteristics, for example, the goal(s) of competition policy, its relation to 
other political and societal goals, the borderline between fair and unfair 
(legitimate and illegitimate) means of competitive interaction.”31 Social 
psychologists have documented that different cultures hold divergent attitudes 
toward competitiveness. Some, such as the Anglo-Saxon cultures, are more 
competitive—and more receptive to competitiveness as a social trait—than 
others, such as Asian cultures.32 
Normative convergence represents the deepest kind of convergence and is 
hence the most elusive. It is perhaps for this reason that it has received the least 
                                                 
23  18/IR/Dec99 (ZACT 2000) (S Afr). 
24  Id at ¶44 n 12, citing United States v Socony Vacuum Oil Co, 310 US 150, 228 (1940) and Dr Miles 
Medical Co v John D Parke & Sons, 220 US 373, 1408 (1911). 
25  Cancun Trading, 18/IR/Dec99 at ¶40 n 11, citing [1986] ECR 353 (1986). 
26  87 OR (3d) 352 (Super Ct Just 2007) (Can). 
27  Id at ¶127, citing 392 US 481 (1968). 
28  Axion Plastics, 87 OR (3d) at ¶¶ 129–30, citing In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig, 305 F3d 145 (3d Cir 
2002). 
29  Case C-333/94 P, [1996] ECR I-5951 (1996). 
30  See id. 
31  Oliver Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition: Competence Allocation in International Competition 
Policy 71 (Edward Elgar 2008). 
32  See Geert Hofstede and Michael Harris Bond, The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to 
Economic Growth, 16 Organizational Dynamics 5, 10–15 (1988). 
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attention among the three types of convergence. It is, however, critical to the 
success of the convergence project for a number of reasons. First, competition 
law enforcement will be most effective if government officials and members of 
society share a common and genuine belief in the benefits of competition. 
Second, the law generally, and competition law specifically, must correspond to 
local norms to gain legitimacy. For instance, in a country that is new to 
competition law and where a “competition culture” is not deeply ingrained, the 
immediate introduction of the criminalization of cartels may not be appropriate. 
Its citizens may genuinely believe that price fixing is not a sufficiently 
blameworthy conduct to warrant criminal sanctions. The disconnect between the 
law and social norms may be so significant that competition law loses its 
legitimacy. This is a particularly grave concern given that competition law is 
perceived as a foreign import in many countries. Extensive and sustainable 
substantive convergence will likely require some degree of normative 
convergence—that is, the gap between the social norms regarding competition 
prevailing in different countries must narrow. 
B.  The Mechanisms for Convergence  
Convergence has taken place at both the national and the international 
levels. On the national level, emerging jurisdictions have made considerable 
effort to learn from the experiences of more established jurisdictions, especially 
the US and the EU. The evolution of the law on resale price maintenance (RPM) 
in recent years provides an apt illustration of convergence. In the 2007 case 
Leegin Creative Leather Products v PSKS,33 the US Supreme Court overturned the 
per se rule for RPMs, which had been in force in the US for almost a century, in 
favor of the rule of reason.34 Since then, other jurisdictions have either 
reconsidered their own positions on the legality of RPMs or adopted the new US 
position. The South Korean Supreme Court, despite clear statutory language 
suggesting a per se approach to RPMs, followed the lead of the US court and 
applied the rule of reason to decide a pharmaceutical case.35 Similarly, the 
                                                 
33  551 US 877, 881 (2007). 
34  The Court explained, “The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice 
restrains trade in violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Antitrust Act].” Id at 885. But, “[t]he rule of 
reason does not govern all restraints. Some types ‘are deemed unlawful per se . . . . The per se rule, 
treating categories of restraints as necessarily illegal, eliminates the need to study the 
reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work.” Id at 886 
(internal citations ommitted). 
35  See Faaez Samadi, Korean Court Overrules Competition Law in Pharma Appeal, Global Competition 
Rev (Nov 26, 2010), online at 
http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/29380/korean-court-overrules-
competition-law-pharma-appeal/ (visited Oct 22, 2011). 
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Indonesian competition authority, the Commission for the Supervision of 
Business Competition (KPPU), announced in Regulation 8/2011 that RPMs will 
be subject to a rule of reason analysis.36 It is unlikely that these jurisdictions 
would have adopted this position on RPMs absent Leegin. 
Convergence on the national level has been even more pronounced in 
cartel enforcement. Up until two decades ago, the US was the only jurisdiction 
with an active criminal enforcement program against cartels. Most other 
jurisdictions did not even impose criminal sanctions on cartel members. Over 
the last decade or so, a number of jurisdictions, such as Australia, Ireland, 
Mexico, New Zealand, and the UK, have either introduced criminal sanctions or 
made them more readily available.37 To complement criminal cartel enforcement, 
leniency programs have been widely adopted, even in jurisdictions such as Japan, 
for which such programs had previously been assumed to be unsuitable.38 It had 
been argued that because of Japan’s cultural emphasis on harmony and social 
cohesion, an enforcement apparatus that relies on betrayal had a small chance of 
success.39 It is no exaggeration to state that a global consensus has emerged, at 
least among the enforcers, on the competitive harms caused by cartels and the 
most effective ways of combating them, including a combination of high fines, 
imprisonment of executives, and leniency programs to induce defections. No 
other area of competition law has witnessed the same degree of convergence. 
Convergence has not been confined to the national level. A number of 
international organizations, namely the ICN, the OECD, and the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), have played a 
pivotal role in bringing about global convergence. UNCTAD has been active in 
international competition law for decades, with a special focus on developing 
countries.40 One of its early accomplishments was the adoption of the Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices, otherwise known as the UN Set, in 1980.41 In 
addition to the UN Set, UNCTAD also published the Model Law on 
                                                 
36  See Norton Rose Group, Indonesia Consults on Draft Guidelines on Discriminatory Practices (May 2011), 
online at http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/51671/competition-law-
developments-in-east-asia (visited Oct 7, 2011). 
37  See Caron Beaton-Wells and Ariel Ezrachi, eds, Criminalizing Cartels: Critical Studies of an 
International Regulatory Movement 109–10, 130–34, 183 (Hart 2011). 
38  See Akinori Uesugi, How Japan is Tackling Enforcement Activities Against Cartels, 13 Geo Mason L Rev 
349, 362 (2005). 
39  See id. 
40  See Gerber, Global Competition at 112–16 (cited in note 5).  
41  See id; UNCTAD, The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition § IV(C), UN Doc 
TD/RBP/CONF/10 (1980). 
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Competition in 2010.42 This is a model competition code of sorts that attempts 
to address the needs of developing countries. It includes an extensive 
commentary on the current practices of not only the established jurisdictions, 
but also the developing country ones. UNCTAD holds annual meetings that 
bring together officials and experts from across the globe to discuss competition 
law issues with particular attention on developing country jurisdictions. These 
meetings also feature peer review of national competition law regimes. Armenia, 
Costa Rica, and Indonesia are some of the recently reviewed jurisdictions.43 
The OECD Competition Committee, currently chaired by Judge Frédéric 
Jenny of the French Cour de Cassation, has been no less active in international 
competition law. Similar to UNCTAD, the OECD conducts peer reviews of 
competition law regimes,44 most recently of Egypt.45 Furthermore, the OECD 
has published recommendations and best practices on a wide variety of 
competition law and policy issues, including competition assessment of 
legislation, merger review, structural separation in regulated industries, cartel 
enforcement, cooperation among OECD member states, and exemptions from 
competition law.46 It has also produced guidelines on bid rigging in public 
procurement.47 The work products of the OCED are influential. Its guidelines 
and recommendations, especially the 1998 Recommendations on Hard Core 
Cartels and 2005 Recommendations on Merger Review, are highly regarded.48 
The OECD also hosts the annual Global Forum on Competition, which is a 
high-level gathering of officials and experts mainly from developed countries. 
Lastly, the organization that has been most widely credited with the success 
of convergence on the international level over the last decade is the ICN. It was 
founded in 2000 by the competition authorities of a number of jurisdictions, all 
                                                 
42  UNCTAD, Model Law on Competition (2010), UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF.7/L.1–L.13 (2010). 
43  UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Policy: Armenia, UN Doc 
UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2010/1 (2010); UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer Review on Competition 
Policy: Costa Rica, UN Doc UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2008/1 (2008); UNCTAD, Voluntary Peer 
Review on Competition Policy: Indonesia, UN Doc UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2009/1 (2009). 
44  See, for example, OECD and IDB, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review (2010). 
45  Brazil, Egypt, and Panama have been reviewed recently. 
46  See, for example, OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Competition Assessment, OECD 
Competition Committee Doc C(2009)130 (2009); OECD, OECD Guiding Principles for Regulatory 
Quality and Performance (2005); OECD, Best Practices for the Formal Exchange of Information Between 
Competition Authorities in Hard Core Cartel Investigations (2005). For the OECD’s full list of 
Recommendations and Best Practices on Competition, see OECD, Recommendations and Best 
Practices on Competition, online at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/59/0,3746,en_2649_37463_4599739_1_1_1_37463,00.html 
(visited Oct 24, 2011). 
47  See generally OECD, Guidelines for Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement (2009). 
48  Gerber, Global Competition at 112 (cited in note 5). 
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of which, except for South Africa and Zambia, are also OECD members.49 What 
distinguishes the ICN from other international organizations is that it is not a 
formal international organization, like the UN or the WTO, in which members 
are admitted on a national basis.50 Instead, it is an informal network of 
competition authorities. According to the factsheet published by the ICN, it now 
boasts 104 member agencies from 92 jurisdictions.51 Apart from its annual 
meeting, which is probably the largest gathering of competition law officials 
from across the globe, the ICN exerts its greatest influence through the 
recommended practices and other work products produced by its working 
groups. The five current working groups cover advocacy, agency effectiveness, 
cartels, mergers, and unilateral conduct.52 The merger review working group, for 
example, has issued recommended practices on both procedural and substantive 
aspects of merger review53 and has produced handbooks on merger guidelines 
and investigative techniques.54 Membership of these working groups is drawn 
from agencies and non-governmental advisors, who are predominantly private 
practitioners from established jurisdictions. 
It is worth discussing briefly how the activities of these international 
organizations promote convergence.55  Peer review facilitates convergence to the 
extent that the reviewers’ suggestions are shaped by their own experiences with 
                                                 
49  The founding members include Australia, Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, South Africa, the UK, the US, and Zambia. Although Israel was not a member of the 
OECD when the ICN was launched, it became an OECD member in 2010. 
50  See Hugh M. Hollman and William E. Kovacic, The International Competition Network: Its Past, 
Current and Future Role, 20 Minn J Intl L 274, 275 n 3 (2011). 
51  See ICN, ICN Factsheet and Key Messages (April 2009), online at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc608.pdf (visited Oct 24, 
2011). 
52  For a list of the current ICN working groups, see ICN, Current Working Groups, online at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current.aspx (visited Oct 24, 
2011). 
53  See ICN, Recommended Practices for Merger Notification Procedures, online at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc588.pdf (visited Oct 24, 
2011); ICN, Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, online at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf (visited Oct 24, 
2011). 
54  See ICN Merger Working Group: Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, ICN Merger Guidelines 
Workbook (Apr 2006), online at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc321.pdf (visited Oct 24, 
2011); ICN, ICN Investigative Techniques Handbook for Merger Review (June 2005), online at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc322.pdf (visited Oct 24, 
2011). 
55  For an extended discussion, see generally Claire R. Kelly and Sungjoon Cho, Promises and Perils of 
New Global Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 Chi J Intl L 491 (2011). 
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their respective jurisdictions and what they perceive to be international best 
practices, which are mostly drawn from the established jurisdictions. The impact 
of socialization at meetings and gatherings should not be underestimated. 
Discussions at the meetings of these international organizations generally focus 
on the practices of the established jurisdictions. Attendance at these meetings is 
likely to encourage, both consciously and subconsciously, officials from the 
emerging jurisdictions to emulate these practices. This tendency to emulate is 
probably reinforced by the relative lack of experience and expertise of the 
officials of the emerging jurisdictions, many of whom consider the ICN and 
other international organization meetings to be mainly educational opportunities. 
The most important way in which these international organizations 
promote convergence is through the issuance of best practices and 
recommendations. The work products of the OECD and the ICN in the area of 
merger review have been particularly influential. Using the terminologies of 
Professors John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, who conducted an exhaustive 
study of the harmonization of business regulation, the established competition 
law jurisdictions pursue convergence through what is known as modeling. They 
define modeling as “[g]lobalization of regulation achieved by observational 
learning with a symbolic content.”56 The established jurisdictions put forward 
their models through their own guidelines or their input into the work products 
of international organizations. These models are then emulated by the emerging 
jurisdictions. The learning that takes place through modeling is augmented by 
the peer review process and socialization at the various international meetings. 
Although the foregoing discussion seems to suggest that convergence at 
the national and international levels constitute two distinct processes, the two 
are, in fact, closely interrelated. As explained earlier, convergence by national 
competition authorities is often pursued in response to efforts by the 
international organizations. Meanwhile, judicial convergence is less closely tied 
to convergence efforts at the international level. The various mechanisms of 
convergence, such as international meetings, peer review, and issuance of 
guidelines and best practices, have less relevance for the judiciary.57 Judicial 
convergence mainly takes place when judges on their own initiative refer to cases 
                                                 
56  John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, Global Business Regulation 25 (Cambridge 2000). 
57  The one possible minor exception is the issuance of guidelines. It is widely acknowledged that the 
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines have garnered considerable respect from the US judiciary. 
Judges have often followed the analytical framework laid out in the Guidelines when deciding 
merger cases. To the extent that the same phenomenon is observed in other jurisdictions, 
issuance of guidelines may indirectly facilitate judicial convergence. See, for example, ICN Merger 
Working Group: Investigation and Analysis Subgroup, ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook *93 (cited 
in note 54).  
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from other jurisdictions.58 However, even judicial convergence is not insulated 
from activities at the international level. If the domestic authority frequently cites 
foreign cases, which is bound to happen as convergence among the agencies 
intensifies, the courts will be more likely to rely on foreign jurisprudence. 
Moreover, judges also attend international meetings and receive training from 
foreign officials and experts, which will familiarize them with foreign cases and 
practices.59 
Modeling can take place from the core to the periphery, in other words, 
from the established jurisdictions to the emerging jurisdictions, or within the 
core itself.60 These two types of modeling are observed in competition law as 
well. There is convergence between the US and the EU, and convergence of the 
rest of the world to the trans-Atlantic core. Although intra-core convergence is 
an integral part of the global convergence process, this Article will focus on 
periphery-to-core convergence. As a theoretical phenomenon, periphery-to-core 
convergence raises questions that have hitherto received scant attention, such as 
the relationship between competition law and development and between 
competition law and culture, which will form the focus of this Article. 
Aside from modeling, the only other mechanism in Braithwaite’s and 
Drahos’s classification that has been utilized extensively in competition law is 
capacity building. The established jurisdictions have provided extensive technical 
                                                 
58  Even if judges do decide to refer to foreign jurisprudence, there is certainly no obligation to 
follow it. For instance, in France Telecom v Commission, the European Court of Justice expressly 
refused to follow the US Supreme Court’s lead in Brooke Group and impose a requirement of 
proof of likelihood of loss recoupment in predatory pricing cases. See France Telecom v Commission, 
Case C-202/07 P, [2009] ECR I-2369, referencing Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp, 509 US 209 (1993). Despite the importance of the authorities in competition law 
enforcement, the lack of a conscious effort to pursue judicial convergence will limit the ultimate 
degree of uniformity that can be achieved across jurisdictions. 
59  UNCTAD provides capacity building and technical assistance to developing countries in the area 
of competition law and policy. Training courses on the implementation of competition policy 
were provided to judges as well as enforcement officials in numerous countries including 
Namibia, the Philippines, and Ukraine. See UNCTAD, Review of Technical Assistance, Advisory and 
Training Programmes on Competition Law and Policy, UN Doc TD/RBP/CONF.5/5 *9 (Sept 25, 
2000). The EU also provides training for judges of its member states on competition law. See 
Vlaams-Europees Verbindingsagentschap, Training of National Judges in EU Competition Law and 
Judicial Co-operation between National Judges (Apr 4, 2011), online at 
http://www.vleva.eu/call/training-national-judges-eu-competition-law-and-judicial-co-operation-
between-national-judges-0 (visited Oct 24, 2011); The Jevons Institute, University College 
London and Institute d’Economie Industrielle, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse, 
Training of Judges in EC Competition Law and Economics (2009), online at www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/judges-
programme/Judges_Training_brochure.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011). 
60  See Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation at 136 (cited in note 56). 
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assistance to emerging jurisdictions.61 When a South Korean official offers 
technical assistance to Vietnam, the frame of reference will inevitably be the 
South Korean regime. This is to be expected, as that is the regime with which 
the official is most familiar. Consciously or not, the South Korean official will be 
facilitating convergence of Vietnamese competition law to the South Korean 
model. Capacity building thus may indirectly contribute to convergence. 
Technical assistance in capacity building is not confined to implementation 
and enforcement. It has been offered at the legislative stage as well. During the 
drafting of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, many established jurisdictions, 
including the US, the EU, Japan, and South Korea, offered technical advice to 
the Chinese government.62 It was widely known at the time that there was a 
battle among the advisors, especially between the US and the EU, to persuade 
the Chinese to follow their respective models. In this instance, the sources of 
technical assistance were actively pushing for convergence to their own models. 
Compared to harmonization in other realms of business and economic 
regulation, competition law is noteworthy for the limited range of mechanisms 
that have been deployed. Apart from modeling and capacity building, 
Braithwaite and Drahos refer to military coercion, economic coercion, systems 
of reward, reciprocal adjustment, and non-reciprocal coordination as 
mechanisms for harmonization. The first three should be self-explanatory, and 
have not been deployed at all in competition law. The fourth and fifth ones 
require some explanation. They refer to adjustments made by parties to the 
negotiation of international treaties. Braithwaite and Drahos define reciprocal 
adjustment as “[g]lobalization of regulation achieved by non-coerced negotiation 
where parties agree to adjust the rules they follow,” while non-reciprocal 
coordination “[o]ccurs when movement toward common rules happen without 
all parties believing they have a common interest in that movement.”63 As there 
are no formal treaty negotiations, these two mechanisms are absent from the 
convergence of competition law. 
The limited range of harmonization mechanisms deployed and the absence 
of formal treaty negotiations have their advantages and disadvantages. The main 
advantage is that the pursuit of convergence in competition law has been spared 
                                                 
61  See D. Daniel Sokol and Kyle W. Stiegart, Exporting Knowledge through Technical Assistance and 
Capacity Building, 6 J Comp L and Econ 233, 236–37 (2010). The US Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have provided technical assistance to more than fifty 
countries around the world from 1988 to 2008. See US DOJ and FTC, Charting the Future Course of 
International Technical Assistance at the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice: A Report 
*1 (2009), online at http://www.ftc.gov/oia/wkshp/docs/exp.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011). 
62  See H. Stephen Harris, The Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s 
Republic of China, 7 Chi J Intl Law 169, 175 (2006). 
63  Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation at 25 (cited in note 56). 
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the protracted and at times acrimonious negotiations that have plagued other 
areas of economic regulation, such as trade law and intellectual property law.64 
The main international organizations driving convergence of competition law 
have largely been able to reach agreement among their members through 
constructive discussions and consensus building. The kind of horse-trading and 
tit-for-tat negotiations that have marred treaty negotiations in other areas of 
global economic regulation are thankfully absent in competition law. 
There are two main reasons for the absence of these problematic 
negotiations: first, the final products—model codes, recommendations, or best 
practices—produced by these organizations are not formally binding. A member 
is free to ignore a particular recommendation as it sees fit. Second, there are 
generally no overriding national interests at stake in the creation of these 
documents. Convergence of competition law is not about preferential treatment 
of foreign goods or opening of national markets, in which various parties may 
consider their interests to be at odds with each other’s. Rather, it is about 
narrowing differences between the various national regimes. The general belief is 
that within the convergence enterprise, all of the jurisdictions are striving toward 
the most effective competition law principles. Convergence of competition law 
is not the tit-for-tat that generally characterizes trade negotiations, which helps 
to minimize conflicts and confrontations. 
The absence of explicit negotiations may have its own disadvantages as 
well. Negotiations are important for precisely the same reasons that they may be 
counterproductive. They give each party the opportunity to provide input into 
the final product. In Braithwaite’s and Drahos’s parlance, negotiations provide a 
platform for reciprocal adjustments. While convergence of competition law 
differs from trade and other international economic treaty negotiations in that 
there are fewer overt exchanges of interests, this does not mean that parties to 
convergence should be denied a meaningful opportunity to provide input into 
the consensus-building process. Without such an opportunity, convergence risks 
being reduced to a series of non-reciprocal coordinations by the emerging 
jurisdictions.65 
This dearth of opportunity for input is compounded by the fact that the 
international consensus to which other jurisdictions are expected to converge 
                                                 
64  See Oxford Analytica, Fate of WTO’s Doha Round Uncertain (Forbes.com Dec 19, 2006), online at 
http://www.forbes.com/2006/12/18/wto-doha-trade-business-cx_1218oxford.html (visited Oct 
24, 2011); Carlos M. Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries: The TRIPS 
Agreement and Policy Options 3–4 (Zed 2000). 
65  According to Braithwaite and Drahos, non-reciprocal coordination occurs “when movement 
toward common rules happens without all parties believing they have a common interest in that 
movement. One party believes the new rule is in their interest, but this belief is not reciprocated.” 
Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation at 25 (cited in note 56).  
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has been largely informed by the US’ and EU’s experiences. Although the 
recommendations and best practices issued by the international organizations do 
not blindly reflect US and EU practices, they are nonetheless heavily influenced 
by them.66 This is a crucial observation. So long as the US and EU approaches 
are suited for the rest of the world, convergence is to be welcomed. However, if 
for any reason the trans-Atlantic consensus does not adequately address the 
needs and circumstances of other countries, convergence could be 
counterproductive.67 The trans-Atlantic consensus will suit other jurisdictions if 
either there exists a set of universally applicable competition law principles or 
the consensus building process contains an effective mechanism to solicit and 
incorporate input from all stakeholders to address their needs. As will be 
explained subsequently, the search for universally applicable competition law 
principles is unlikely to be fruitful. This creates a greater need for inclusiveness 
in the consensus-building process. 
The extent to which the consensus-building process within international 
organizations incorporates input from the emerging competition law 
jurisdictions varies. UNCTAD has probably done the most to incorporate the 
concerns and needs of developing countries, which form the bulk of the 
competition law jurisdictions in the world. OECD is a club of developed 
nations. Its recommendations and best practices are formulated by and primarily 
intended for its own members, which are predominantly developed countries. 
While non-OECD members may become observers of the Competition 
Committee, their input into the final products of the Committee is necessarily 
                                                 
66  For example, one can certainly detect the influence of the US and the EU merger guidelines in the 
ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook. See ICN Merger Working Group: Investigation and Analysis 
Subgroup, ICN Merger Guidelines Workbook (cited in note 54). Also, in the OECD peer review 
issued in 2006, Argentina was encouraged to focus on anti-cartel enforcement. See OECD, 
Competition Law and Policy in Argentina: A Peer Review *46 (2006), online at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/36/57/37970045.pdf (visited Nov 9, 2011). While there is a 
general consensus among developed countries that anti-cartel enforcement is the most important 
aspect of competition enforcement, some have argued that abuse of dominance is a more serious 
problem in developing countries, especially where there is a powerful state-owned sector. In the 
peer review report issued in 2010, the OECD Competition Committee recommended that the 
Brazilian authority focus on structural remedies as opposed to behavioral remedies in merger 
cases. See OECD Competition Committee, Competition Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review at 78 
(cited in note 44). This recommendation also reflects to some extent the enforcement strategy of 
the US agencies, which generally prefer structural remedies.  
67  This concern would be alleviated if the US and the EU took into account the possibility of 
convergence when fashioning their approaches to competition law issues. However, there is no 
evidence that this is done. One may even argue that it would be absurd for them to do so and 
resolve cases differently in light of the possibility of convergence. After all, their regulations and 
guidelines are primarily intended to provide guidance on their own enforcement strategies and 
methodologies and not as models for other jurisdictions.  
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limited.68 In fact, the purpose of the observer program seems not to be to obtain 
non-member input, but to help spread the OECD’s views on competition law 
and policy to non-members.69 ICN membership covers competition authorities 
from across the world. It has the mandate to forge a truly global consensus. 
However, the way in which its working groups function may invite criticisms of 
overrepresentation by developed-country private practitioners and cast doubt on 
the representativeness of its consensus.70 In particular, there seems to be 
insufficient recognition within the ICN of the need for competition law 
principles to be tailored to local circumstances. All of this places the onus on the 
emerging jurisdictions to exercise caution when deciding the extent to which 
their domestic laws and practices should converge to the international 
consensus. 
C. Effectiveness of Convergence as a Harmonization Strategy  
The convergence promoted by these international organizations is of a soft 
rather than a hard kind. The choice of mechanisms—modeling and capacity 
building—limits the kind of convergence that can be achieved. Proponents of 
convergence do not endeavor to adopt a formally binding code or principles on 
competition law, as was attempted under the Havana Charter by the aborted 
International Trade Organization (ITO) after the Second World War and under 
the so-called Singapore agenda within the WTO in the 1990s.71 Harmonization 
within the ITO and the WTO would have been formally binding. It would have 
involved a top-down effort, as opposed to a bottom-up process. Instead, 
international organizations, such as the ICN, the OECD, and UNCTAD, 
promote convergence that is initiated on a voluntary basis by the jurisdictions 
                                                 
68  See OECD, Competition Committee, Pro-Active Strategy vis-à-vis Non-Members, OECD Doc 
DAF/COMP(2005)26 (2005). The main role of the observers is “to associate themselves to 
certain Council Recommendations, to undergo a peer review exercise, to make written 
contributions to Committee roundtables, to actively participate in the Committee’s outreach 
events and to disseminate the Committee’s recommendations and best practices to other 
authorities.” Id at 2.  
69  See id at 7. The Proactive Strategy document enumerates a list of criteria for evaluating  the 
performance of observers and states that renewal of observer status is not automatic, so as to give 
observers the incentives to meet the expectations of the Committee, one of which is to “associate 
themselves to certain Council Recommendations.” Id. 
70  See Hollman and Kovacic, 20 Minn J Intl L at 304 (cited in note 50) (“To date, the principal 
contributions have been made by NGAs from the private sector. As noted above, this has raised 
questions within the ICN about whether the network ought to engage academics, consumer 
groups, and think tanks more fully in its program.”).  
71  Gerber, Global Competition at 38–52 (cited in note 5); WTO, Understanding the WTO: Cross-Cutting 
and New Issues, online at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey3_e.htm 
(visited Oct 24, 2011). 
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themselves. In fact, the term “convergence” was probably chosen to avoid the 
connotation of compulsion or top-down imposition and to emphasize the 
voluntary nature of the enterprise. 
The lack of binding force, however, has not undermined the effectiveness 
of the approach. Competition law stands out as a field of law that has achieved a 
considerable degree of global uniformity without resorting to formally binding 
legal instruments. The most notable example is the 1992 Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines (1992 Guidelines) issued by the US Department of Justice and the 
US Federal Trade Commission. A casual examination of the horizontal merger 
guidelines issued by most major jurisdictions would reveal a substantial degree of 
similarity to the 1992 Guidelines.72 The analytical approach laid down in those 
Guidelines, especially the Small but Significant and Non-transitory Increase in 
Price (SSNIP) test used for market definition, has been embraced by most 
jurisdictions. Until the issuance of a new set of guidelines by the US agencies in 
2010, the 1992 Guidelines were widely regarded as the gold standard for merger 
review across the globe.73 
It is worth pondering what accounts for the remarkable success of 
convergence thus far, especially in light of its voluntary nature. There are a 
number of reasons for this success. First and foremost, competition law is a 
highly technical area of law that requires intimate knowledge of a variety of 
disciplines, such as economics, accounting, and business. Its highly 
interdisciplinary nature sets it apart from most other areas of law and contributes 
to its unfamiliarity to most legal practitioners and even judges outside of the 
field. This unfamiliarity is compounded by the fact that competition law is 
relatively new to most jurisdictions. Most of the existing competition law 
jurisdictions only adopted their law within the last three decades.74 The lack of 
expertise and experience in most emerging jurisdictions renders them more 
receptive to knowledge transfer from more established jurisdictions. 
Another reason for the success of convergence is the largely administrative 
nature of competition law enforcement. With the exception of the US, 
                                                 
72  See William Blumenthal, The Challenge of Sovereignty and the Mechanisms of Convergence, 72 Antitrust L J 
267, 270 (2004) (“For twenty-two years the U.S. Merger Guidelines have offered something of a 
template for substantive merger analysis.”). See generally Rachel Brandenburger and Joseph 
Matelis, The 2010 U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Historical and International Perspective, 25 
Antitrust 48, 49 (2011). 
73  An examination of horizontal merger guidelines adopted in other jurisdictions since 1992 reveals 
that many of them are similar to the 1992 Guidelines. See, for example, European Commission, 
Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of 
Concentrations between Undertakings 2008 OJ (C 265) 7; KFTC, Guidelines for M&A Review (2007); UK 
Competition Commission and Office of Fair Trading, Merger Assessment Guidelines (2010). 
74  See UNCTAD, Guidebook on Competition Systems, UN Doc UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2007/2 (2007). 
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enforcement authorities rather than private parties bring the bulk of competition 
cases in most jurisdictions.75 Private action plays a very small role in a majority of 
jurisdictions.76 The preponderance of public enforcement gives competition 
authorities a powerful lever to steer development of the law in their respective 
jurisdictions. They can do so through careful selection of cases. If an authority 
believes that a particular mode of business conduct, such as unilateral refusal to 
deal, should be legal, the authority could limit the judiciary’s opportunity to 
reach a contrary result by declining to bring cases involving such conduct. The 
role of the authorities is even more prominent in merger review than in 
enforcement against restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance. Few merger 
cases are litigated. In most transactions, the authorities have the final word on 
whether a merger may proceed. This state of affairs is conducive to 
convergence, as the number of actors that need to agree within a jurisdiction for 
successful convergence is reduced by virtue of the administrative nature of 
competition law enforcement. 
Two other characteristics of competition law enforcement further facilitate 
convergence. The first is the reliance on informal instruments such as guidelines. 
Because guidelines do not legally bind the authorities themselves or the courts in 
most jurisdictions, and are mere articulations of enforcement policies, the 
authorities have considerable discretion over their content. There is generally 
little or no national legislative involvement in the issuance of guidelines. This 
means that whatever consensus is reached among the enforcement officials can 
be given direct effect through these informal instruments without being 
adulterated by domestic political compromise, which is a necessary feature of the 
legislative process. 
The second characteristic is the case-specific nature of competition law 
enforcement. Competition law does not impose detailed ex ante regulation that 
applies across the board. Business conduct is presumed to be legal unless 
determined otherwise ex post by the authorities or the courts. This contrasts 
with, say, banking regulation, which requires the regulator to issue detailed rules 
on the operations of a bank. Banks need to know with what rules they must 
                                                 
75  Close to 90 percent of the antitrust cases in the US are brought by private plaintiffs. See Robert 
H. Lande and Joshua P. Davis, An Evaluation of Private Antitrust Enforcement: 29 Case Studies, Interim 
Report for the American Antitrust Institute Private Enforcement Project 3 (November 8, 2006). 
See also Bureau of Justice Statistics, Antitrust Cases filed in United States District Courts by Type of Case, 
1975–2010 in Kathleen Maguire, ed, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online (Albany 2010), 
online at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412010.pdf (visited Oct 24, 2011). 
76  For instance, the European Commission has been trying for years to encourage private 
enforcement of competition law in the EU. It has issued a number of consultation documents on 
this. See, for example, European Commission, White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC 
Antitrust Rules, EC Doc COM(2008) 165 final (2008). 
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comply in advance, and contradictory rules may render compliance impossible. 
Therefore, in order for banking regulation to converge globally, the regulators 
must reach an explicit agreement on the content of the various detailed national 
rules.77 The sort of open-ended convergence process that has taken place in 
competition is unlikely to work as a harmonization strategy for banking 
regulation. The lack of detailed ex ante rules in competition law reduces the need 
for the authorities to pursue express negotiations and creates an environment 
conducive to voluntary convergence. The international consensus is articulated 
by established jurisdictions and international organizations. Other jurisdictions 
can then choose to converge upon it at their own pace and to the extent suitable 
for their domestic circumstances. This explains why the voluntary convergence 
model, which is somewhat unusual in the international harmonization context, 
has worked so well for competition law. 
IV.  THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF CONVERGENCE  
Having examined the phenomenon of convergence in some detail, the rest 
of this Article will be devoted to the questions of how far convergence should 
continue and whether there are reasons to caution against a push for further 
convergence. It is important to clarify the precise focus of the ensuing 
discussion. As suggested in the previous Section, convergence can take place at 
the procedural level, the substantive level, and the normative level. With respect 
to substantive convergence, this Article has no objection to the propagation of 
competition law analysis that is effects-based and incorporates economic 
learning. The competitive effects of a business practice should be determined by 
the application of sound economic principles to solid empirical data. The 
emerging competition law jurisdictions should guard against the kind of form-
based adjudication that characterized US antitrust law in the 1950s and 1960s 
and the early EU jurisprudence.78 
                                                 
77  See Philip R. Wood, Law and Practice of International Finance 329, 352 (Sweet and Maxwell 2009); 
World Bank, Finance and Private Sector Research (Bank Regulation and Supervision Database 2007), 
online at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRES/Resources/469232-
1107449512766/Banking_regulation_Survey_III_061008.xls (visited Oct 27, 2011) (compiling 
data for 143 countries on domestic regulatory requirements for entry into banking sector by 
domestic and foreign entities); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Progress Report on Basel III 
Implementation (Oct 2011), online at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs203.pdf (visited Oct 27, 2011) 
(detailing domestic implementation of Basel rules on financial regulation). 
78  For criticisms of the kind of form-based approach to vertical agreements adopted by the US 
Supreme Court, in particular in the 1960s, see Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at 
War with Itself 280–98 (Basic 1978); Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of 
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U Chi L Rev 6 (1981). 
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The adoption of effects-based analysis premised on economic learning, 
however, does not mandate one approach or one outcome to cases. Contrary to 
common belief, there need not be one single economic approach to competition 
issues. There is a considerable range of issues over which mainstream 
economists have disagreed, such as whether concentrated or competitive 
markets are more conducive to innovation, the importance of predation and 
entry deterrence, the impact of industry concentration on market performance, 
and the meaning of the standard oligopoly models for real-world markets.79 This 
Article lends full support to substantive convergence of a methodological kind, 
in other words, to convergence with respect to the techniques used in economic 
analysis. The ensuing discussion, however, questions whether substantive 
convergence of a doctrinal kind, specifically, the harmonization of rules on the 
legality of conduct, is advisable. As Budzinski has argued, the reliance on 
economics does not necessitate such kind of convergence.80 What remains to be 
explored is whether there are other economic or non-economic reasons 
justifying such convergence. 
A.  Globalization and Convergence  
Before turning to possible reasons for caution, we need to ask ourselves 
several questions. Why should the competition laws of various jurisdictions 
converge in the first place? What would be the harm if current efforts at 
convergence stalled? Does the harm outweigh whatever possible benefits there 
may be of maintaining regulatory diversity? Are there good reasons for retaining 
regulatory diversity? As it turns out, the answers to these questions vary 
somewhat according to the areas of competition law at issue. 
The obvious justification for convergence is that it will help to minimize 
instances of contradictory rules and decisions, which in turn will lower 
compliance costs for firms operating in multiple jurisdictions. To some 
                                                 
79  See Budzinski, Governance of Global Competition at 108 (cited in note 31). Joseph Schumpeter and 
Kenneth Arrow famously disagreed over whether a concentrated or a competitive market is more 
conducive to innovation. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy 87–120 
(Harper Collins 2008); Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in Universities-Natl Bureau Committee for Econ Research, ed, The Rate and Direction of Inventive 
Activity: Economic and Social Factors 609, 619–20 (Natl Bureau of Econ Research 1962). Harold 
Demsetz also critiqued the structure-conduct-performance paradigm proposed by Joe Bain. See 
Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in H.J. Goldschmid and J.F. Weston, eds, 
Industrial Concentration: The New Learning 167–84 (Little, Brown 1974). See generally Joseph Bain, 
Industrial Organization (2d ed John Wiley 1968). 
80  See Budzinski, Governance of Global Competition at 108 (cited in note 31) (“However, any claim that 
industrial economics would have provided a [sic] unambiguous manual to the ‘right’ competition 
policy cannot be sustained—even if competition economics could been [sic] reduced to 
theoretical industrial economics.”). 
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commentators, the convergence of competition law is a necessary consequence 
of globalization.81 The argument is that globalization has eroded the boundaries 
of national markets and has caused markets to become increasingly integrated, if 
not outright global in reach.82 When firms and consumers are no longer confined 
by national boundaries, any regulation of markets that is premised on these 
boundaries becomes obsolete. Global markets with multinational corporations 
as participants require a global competition law. This argument seems highly 
convincing at first blush, and has been invoked in other areas of law to justify 
international harmonization. However, it also runs the risk of oversimplification. 
While it may be accurate to characterize markets as global if both the buyers and 
the sellers are international in scope and transactions take place across borders, 
the same characterization may not be accurate when internationalization only 
happens on the seller’s side. 
Take commercial aircraft as an example. This market is generally 
considered to be global in nature because there are only a few firms supplying 
customers wherever they are located. In fact, it is largely a duopoly consisting of 
Boeing and Airbus.83 The commercial customers are airline companies, which 
are global in reach. In contrast, the market for consumer personal care products, 
such as toothpaste and shampoo, has long been dominated by a handful of 
multinational corporations, especially Unilever and Procter & Gamble.84 That 
alone, however, does not render that market global. It is a well-known fact that 
these products require a high degree of localization.85 What is considered an 
attractive odor for shampoo in one country may be repulsive in another. The 
buyer’s side of the market for these products remains highly local in nature. It is 
difficult to see why regulation of such a market should be internationally 
                                                 
81  See Barry J. Rodger, Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective, 6 Colum J 
Eur L 289, 312–13 (2000); Gerber, Global Competition at 79–85 (cited in note 5). But see Eleanor 
M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty and Antitrust: The Other Path, 13 Sw J L & Trade Am 211, 
216–220 (2007) (“Developing countries retort that antitrust for developing countries must also 
address concerns of distribution and power. Developed countries rejoin that global efficiency 
demands that laws converge, and laws should converge toward that of the developed world.”). 
82  See Rodger, 6 Colum J Eur L at 291–92 (cited in note 81). National competition authorities and 
courts have found the relevant market to be global in quite a few cases, such as the Oracle-
PeopleSoft merger case. See United States v Oracle Corp, 331 F Supp 2d 1098, 1164 (ND Cal 2007). 
83  See Richard Aboulafia, Airbus vs. Boeing: Year Four (Aerospace America Online Nov 2001), online 
at http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=151&ArchiveIssueID=20 (visited Oct 
24, 2011). 
84  See Lee Ann Graul, et al, Procter & Gamble, Unilever and the Personal Products Industry (AMBA 607 
Feb 2006).  
85  See Peter Mouncey and Frank Wimmer, eds, Market Research Best Practice: 30 Visions for the Future 
450–51 (Wiley 2009). 
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harmonized simply because a few multinational corporations are the major 
global producers. 
Budzinski puts the argument most succinctly:  
Internationalization and globalisation of markets do not imply that each 
market becomes an international one in the course of time. With traditional 
industries, a coexistence of national or more regional or local markets can 
be observed, depending—among other things—on the characteristics of the 
respective goods and services as well as on the preferences of consumers. It 
is difficult to identify reasons why this would be different even in a fully 
integrated world economy.86 
In other words, globalization does not imply the disappearance of local markets. 
So long as such local markets exist, there remains a role for national competition 
regimes to play and possible grounds for divergence among them. While 
globalization may justify alignment of competition law rules that apply to truly 
transnational business practices, it does not require the wholesale convergence 
of national competition regimes. Convergence requires a more persuasive 
justification than that. 
Competition law is not the only area of business regulation that faces the 
problem of cross-jurisdictional regulatory inconsistencies. Such inconsistencies 
are a fact of life for multinational corporations and are present in most areas of 
law. Corporation law, tax law, labor law, products liability law, securities 
regulation, food and drug safety law, environmental law, and sector-specific 
regulations for network industries are but a few examples. Compliance costs 
would certainly be lower for multinational firms if all these areas of law were 
harmonized. Firms would only need to produce one set of financial reports for 
every jurisdiction in which they issue shares.87 They could use the same 
employment contracts and adopt the same human resource policies. They could 
avoid problems with double taxation. They could adopt the same content labels 
for their food and drug products. And they would only need to comply with one 
set of environmental regulations. These would no doubt be highly convenient 
for multinational firms. Yet calls for harmonization in these areas of law are less 
often heard than in competition law. For instance, Braithwaite and Drahos note 
that corporation law is one of the areas of business regulation that has been 
relatively free from efforts at harmonization.88 Therefore, it is worth pondering 
whether competition law possesses any special attributes that render it 
particularly suitable for or in need of convergence. 
                                                 
86  Budzinski, Governance of Global Competition at 13 (cited in note 31). 
87  This is, to some extent, possible under current SEC regulations, which allow foreign issuers to use 
the financial reports prepared for their home jurisdictions to meet SEC requirements.  
88  See Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation at 167 (cited in note 56). 
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B.  A Proposed Analytical Framework  
For the purpose of determining its suitability for harmonization, business 
regulation can be classified by the subject matter of regulation. A regulation may 
focus on a business entity, such as a bank or an insurance company; a product, 
such as a food item or a pharmaceutical product; or a process, such as 
manufacturing production or a securities issuance. There is, of course, overlap 
between these categories. For example, securities regulation may be 
characterized as regulation of shares as a product, as opposed to the issuance 
process itself. Likewise, merger review can be plausibly characterized as either an 
entity-based regulation or regulation of the merger process. The classification 
exercise inevitably requires some judgment calls and ultimately depends on the 
relative emphasis of the regulation. Merger review is more appropriately 
classified as entity-based regulation as opposed to process-based regulation 
because it is not focused on the corporate procedures governing a merger 
transaction, but on the competitive effects exerted by the merged entity on the 
relevant market. Securities regulation is more aptly described as process-based 
regulation because it is primarily concerned with the process of issuing shares to 
the public rather than the content of the shares themselves. 
The reach of product-based and process-based regulations is usually 
limited by the geographical area of a jurisdiction. These regulations rarely apply 
if the product is not sold or the process does not take place within the 
jurisdiction’s territory, although extra-territorial application of regulations is on 
the rise in some areas.89 For instance, a jurisdiction’s food and drug regulation 
will only govern food and pharmaceutical products sold or manufactured within 
its territory.90 In general, a jurisdiction’s environmental standards will only apply 
if a firm sells its products or operates in that jurisdiction.91 
The situation is slightly more complex for entity-based regulation. Entity-
based regulation may apply to any business entities that operate in its territory, 
or only those that have established a nexus to the jurisdiction, such as through 
                                                 
89  One notable example of extra-territorial application of domestic regulation in recent years is the 
UK Bribery Act, which applies to the corrupt practices of UK firms operating abroad. See Bribery 
Act, 2010, c 23, § 6 (UK). Another area which has seen expansion of extra-territorial application is 
anti-money laundering laws. See International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist 
Financing Act of 2001, 18 USC §§ 301–03, 311–30, 351–66, 371–77 (2006). 
90  See Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation at 386–87 (cited in note 56) (discussing 
harmonization of national pharmaceutical regulatory regimes and regulatory competition among 
regimes); id at 410–11 (referring to mutual recognition of national food regulations). 
91  See Daniel Esty and Damien Geradin, Environmental Protection and International Competitiveness: A 
Conceptual Framework, 32 J World Trade 5, 8–9 (1998). See also Joanne Scott, From Brussels with 
Love: The Transatlantic Travels of European Law and the Chemistry of Regulatory Attraction, 57 Am J of 
Comp L 897, 921–22 (2009). 
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business registration or incorporation. Corporation law generally only applies to 
corporate entities that are incorporated within a jurisdiction.92 Meanwhile, 
banking regulation, or at least some parts of it, will apply to any bank that 
operates in it. 
The case for harmonization ultimately comes down to a weighing of the 
costs and benefits of convergence. The benefits of convergence are determined 
by the possibility and costs of accommodating inconsistent regulations, which 
this Article will call regulatory accommodation, by the regulated entity, which in 
turn depends on the type of regulation at issue. By harmonizing inconsistent 
regulations, convergence reduces or eliminates the need for regulatory 
accommodation. The costs of regulatory accommodation are hence reduced or 
eliminated. The costs of convergence are the loss of national regulatory 
prerogative, which refers to the ability to design and enforce regulation 
according to local needs and circumstances. 
Let us first turn our attention to the benefits of convergence. The 
possibility of regulatory accommodation varies by the type of regulation at issue. 
Some types of regulation give firms considerable leeway to accommodate 
regulatory inconsistencies, while others may not leave open such a possibility. 
The easiest case is probably product-based regulations, which can be 
accommodated by producing and labeling the products according to local 
regulation. The possibility and ease of such accommodation is attested to by the 
fact that it is regularly done by firms all over the world. 
The ability of firms to accommodate inconsistent process-based 
regulations depends on the portability of the process at issue. There are two 
main types of processes undertaken by firms that may be the subject of 
regulation: production and sales. Regulation of the sales process may in turn 
focus on marketing, distribution, or other steps in the sales process. A 
production process would be highly portable before a plant is built. When a firm 
is still deciding the location of its production facility, it can choose the most 
favorable regulatory regime. Regulatory competition among jurisdictions to 
attract foreign direct investment is well documented.93 Therefore, at that stage, 
inconsistent regulations are generally not a serious obstacle, and may, in fact, 
present lucrative opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. A production process 
becomes highly immobile once the manufacturing facility has been built. Firms 
                                                 
92  See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 Colum L Rev 
1098, 1098 (1998) (referring to jurisdiction-based limitations of corporate law and the ensuing 
regulatory competition among the various states in the US). 
93  See, for example Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 Georgetown L J 1725 (2005); 
Charles Oman, Policy Competition for Foreign Direct Investment: A Study of Competition among Governments 
to Attract FDI (OECD 2000). 
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will have no choice but to comply with the local regulations. However, by then, 
regulatory inconsistencies cease to be an issue for that facility; it complies with 
one set of regulations. A manufacturing plant is usually only subject to the 
regulations of the jurisdiction in which it is located. Regulatory inconsistencies 
only become relevant at the firm-wide level. 
If the process being regulated is a sales transaction, portability hinges on 
the transferability of the transaction, which in turn is determined by the 
geographical mobility of the buyer and the seller. Unsurprisingly, the mobility of 
the buyer and the seller varies by the type of transaction at issue. For a securities 
offering, the seller is generally highly mobile. A corporation can choose to list 
itself in New York, London, Hong Kong, or practically anywhere else in the 
world.94 Buyer mobility is constrained by the sophistication of the buyer and 
government regulation. An institutional investor will have no trouble following 
the issuer to another stock exchange.95 A retail investor will have greater 
difficulty doing the same. However, even that may be changing with the advent 
of new technology and the convenience of online trading. With more general 
types of sales transaction, either the seller or, more likely, the buyer may have 
little geographical mobility. For example, the sale of foodstuffs to retail 
consumers is unlikely to be portable: the buyer is unlikely to travel long distances 
for such goods.96 In that case, the firm may have little choice but to comply with 
the local regulation. 
The possibility of accommodating inconsistent entity-based regulations 
depends on the coverage of the regulation, whether it covers the full entity or 
only part of it. If a regulation applies to the entire firm, there is little room for 
accommodating inconsistent regulations. If a regulation only applies to the local 
subsidiary, and it is possible for different branches of the firm to comply with 
different regulations, the situation is no different from that of process-based 
regulation after a manufacturing facility has been constructed. While the local 
                                                 
94  See Howell E. Jackson and Eric J. Pan, Regulatory Competition in International Securities Markets: 
Evidence from Europe—Part II, 3 Va L Bus Rev 207, 228 (2008) (analyzing reasons why European 
issuers choose to gain access to the US capital markets); Erica Fung, Regulatory Competition in 
International Capital Markets: Evidence from China in 2004-2005, 3 NYU J L & Bus 243, 290–96 
(2007) (discussing Chinese issuers’ choice of capital markets from among US, Hong Kong, 
London, Japan, and Singapore). 
95 Fung, 3 NYU J L & Bus at 296 (cited in note 94) (“Finally, an emerging theme from the 
interviews was that US investors are becoming increasingly indifferent to where a company is 
listed. . . . The fact is, US-based institutional investors do not limit their investments to shares 
listed only on US exchanges. . . . Capital markets have become truly global, and this fundamental 
change has dramatically altered the traditional fund raising practices of Chinese firms.”) 
96  The advent of the Internet and online websites has no doubt considerably enhanced the 
geographical mobility of the buyer. Yet it remains possible for a local jurisdiction to regulate a 
sales transaction between a domestic buyer and an online website. 
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operation will have no choice but to comply with local regulation, regulatory 
inconsistencies will only arise at the firm-wide level. These inconsistencies do 
not render compliance impossible. 
As should be obvious, the case for convergence is stronger if regulatory 
accommodation is impossible. If mutually exclusive regulations from two 
jurisdictions apply to the same firm simultaneously, there is a pressing need to 
harmonize these regulations. This refers to full entity regulation. If 
accommodation is possible, as in the case of the remaining types of regulation, 
the desirability of convergence depends on the magnitude of accommodation 
costs incurred by the firms and the mode of accommodation. 
Within the subset of regulations for which regulatory accommodation is 
possible, there are two modes of accommodation. The first mode of 
accommodation is circumvention. Firms simply eschew less desirable regulatory 
regimes in favor of more business-friendly ones. If the listing rules of a certain 
jurisdiction are deemed to be too onerous, a firm can choose to list its shares 
elsewhere. To the extent that other relevant factors such as the liquidity and 
prestige of the alternative markets are comparable, firms can circumvent the 
problem of regulatory inconsistencies by submitting to the most favorable 
regime. This kind of forum shopping is only possible if the transaction process is 
portable. Otherwise, firms are left with the only other mode of accommodation, 
which is compliance. This is most likely to be the case with product-based 
regulation. If a jurisdiction stipulates certain content or labeling requirements for 
all beef products sold within it, a firm will have no choice but to comply with 
these rules if it sells in that jurisdiction. Purchasers of beef are unlikely to be 
sufficiently mobile to permit effective circumvention of that jurisdiction’s 
regulation by the seller. 
The relationship between the mode of accommodation and 
harmonization—whether ease of circumvention justifies more or less 
harmonization—depends on the perspective one takes. From a firm’s 
perspective, easy circumvention probably renders regulatory inconsistencies a 
less pressing issue. So long as the alternatives are comparable in most other 
respects, a firm can choose the regulatory environment that best meets its 
business needs. From a regulator’s perspective, however, the possibility of forum 
shopping lends support to harmonization. This is aptly illustrated by the US’ and 
the OECD’s focus on money laundering.97 If one accepts that a particular 
regulatory objective, such as combating money laundering, should be pursued 
internationally, the ease of circumvention justifies upward harmonization of 
                                                 
97  The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs collaborates with the Financial Action Task Force, an 
inter-governmental policymaking body, to harmonize anti-money laundering efforts. See OECD, 
Tax Crimes and Money Laundering, online at www.oecd.org/ctp/taxcrimes (visited Oct 24, 2011). 
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relevant laws and efforts to eliminate havens for money laundering. Which 
perspective dominates, it seems, would depend on the regulatory objective being 
pursued. If the kind of conduct being targeted is clearly wrongful, such as money 
laundering or bribery, the regulator’s perspective tends to dominate. If the kind 
of conduct being targeted is morally neutral or concerns a matter of national 
importance, such as fiscal sovereignty, the regulator’s desire for harmonization 
may need to be balanced against other considerations. Political concerns may 
interfere and prevent regulators from pursuing the optimal regulatory strategy. 
With respect to regulation for which the mode of accommodation is 
compliance, the desirability of harmonization comes down to a weighing of its 
costs and benefits. The benefits are the potential savings of compliance costs 
incurred by the firms. While such potential savings are to be welcomed, their 
significance depends on the extent of globalization of the market at issue. To the 
extent that a market is truly globalized, in the sense that both the buyer’s and the 
seller’s sides of the market are internationally integrated, firms could realistically 
adopt a uniform distribution and operational strategy across countries. Disparate 
regulations are a genuine, or perhaps even the only, stumbling block to achieving 
substantial transaction cost savings across countries. Meanwhile, for a non-
globalized market, firms will have to adopt localized business strategies anyway. 
The potential savings from harmonization will be considerably smaller. The 
justification for convergence is correspondingly less persuasive. 
As mentioned earlier, the costs of harmonization include loss of the 
regulatory prerogative of individual jurisdictions. Such loss may not impose 
substantial costs, which would be the case when there is a single efficient 
approach to regulation, or when what matters is not the merit, but the 
uniformity, of regulation. An example would be the design for electric plugs and 
sockets. While different designs may vary somewhat in their safety and other 
performance features, the gains from a superior but inconsistent design are 
dwarfed by the benefits of uniformity. Travelers across the world would save 
much hassle and money if sockets and plugs in different countries were 
standardized. Manufacturers could also avoid substantial costs by producing 
electrical appliances with one type of plug. Aside from this subset of regulations, 
however, there are myriad considerations that demand diversity in regulatory 
approaches. The loss of national regulatory prerogative will be particularly costly 
if these considerations bear on the effectiveness of the regulation or even the 
general welfare of the jurisdiction. As will be illustrated below, this is likely to be 
the case for competition law. 
To sum up, the three types of regulation—entity-based, product-based, and 
process-based regulations—present cases of varying strengths for 
harmonization. Full entity regulation presents the most convincing case for 
harmonization. Whether circumventable process-based regulation should be 
harmonized depends on the regulatory objective being pursued. The remaining 
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types of regulation—product-based regulation, non-circumventable process-
based regulation, and partial entity regulation—all leave firms only with the 
option of compliance. Whether these types of regulation should be harmonized 
boils down to a tradeoff between potential savings in compliance costs and the 
importance of preserving national regulatory prerogative. 
C. Harmonization and National Regulatory Prerogative  
At this juncture, it may be worthwhile to explore the relationship between 
harmonization and regulatory prerogative. The compatibility of harmonization 
with the preservation of national regulatory prerogative depends on the number 
of regulatory objectives implicated by an area of regulation. Most realms of 
regulation pursue multiple and potentially conflicting regulatory objectives, 
which entails a weighing of the objectives and a tradeoff between regulatory 
costs and effectiveness. The fewer the regulatory objectives, the more likely it is 
that different jurisdictions will arrive at a similar balance or tradeoff. Conversely, 
the higher the number of regulatory objectives, the harder it is to reach a 
consensus. Therefore, the multiplicity of regulatory objectives may render an 
area of regulation unsuitable for harmonization; harmonization will entail the 
imposition of a consensus in the face of justified diversity. 
This can be illustrated by food safety regulation. Food safety has been 
substantially harmonized on the global scale. The Codex Alimentarius 
Commission in Rome has issued common standards for food safety that run 
twenty-five volumes in three languages, including over two hundred standards, 
forty codes and guidelines on a wide variety of issues related to food production, 
packaging, and distribution.98 The Codex has received support from developed 
and developing nations alike.99 Its standards have been adopted as references in 
trade disputes within the WTO by the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures, which was part of the 1993 Final Act of the Uruguay Round of 
GATT negotiations.100 
A host of political, economic, and historical factors have contributed to the 
success of the harmonization of food safety standards.101 This success, however, 
is at least partly explained by the fact that food safety standards chiefly focus on 
one regulatory objective: the protection of consumers from unsafe food 
products. The relevant regulatory tradeoff is between ensuring the safety of food 
products and keeping compliance costs by food producers and distributors 
                                                 
98  See Braithwaite and Drahos, Global Business Regulation at 401 (cited in note 56).  
99  See id. 
100  See id at 403.  
101  See generally id at 399–417. 
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manageable. Jurisdictions may disagree on the appropriate tradeoff, but their 
differences are only a matter of degree. Meanwhile, the compromise will be 
considerably more complicated if the relevant tradeoff involves multiple 
regulatory objectives. Jurisdictions may accord different weights to the various 
regulatory objectives, which in turn may affect how the tradeoff on regulatory 
effectiveness is struck. Divergence in how countries choose to make this 
tradeoff will obviously render the attainment of a global consensus considerably 
more difficult, if not impossible. 
D.  Application of the Proposed Framework to  Competition 
Law 
What does all this mean for the global convergence of competition law? 
Does competition law present a convincing case for convergence? Various areas 
of competition law need to be analyzed differently under the proposed 
framework. Merger review is entity-based regulation. Even though it governs a 
process—merger or acquisition—the ultimate outcome is a change in the 
structure of business entities. The focus of the regulation is not on the process 
of merger, but on the competitive impact of the merged entity on the relevant 
markets. Whether merger review is partial or full entity regulation may depend 
on the remedy being ordered. If a merger is being blocked, it affects the firms 
concerned in their entirety. If only divestitures are ordered, the decision only 
affects parts of the firms.102 Divestiture orders imposed by different jurisdictions 
may still conflict with each other. Given the possibility of an outright rejection 
of a proposed transaction, merger review should be considered as full entity 
regulation, which means that there is a strong case for convergence from the 
perspective of regulatory accommodation. 
The need to avoid conflicting merger review decisions, however, should 
not be overstated. Here, it is again important to distinguish between genuinely 
globalized markets and local markets. If a merger involves global markets, and 
the competitive effects of the transaction are felt the same way in different 
jurisdictions, there is a strong argument for a harmonized approach to merger 
analysis and perhaps a single decision on the transaction. Assuming that these 
jurisdictions pursue similar goals under their competition law—and this 
assumption will be substantially qualified in subsequent sections—and their 
competition authorities are analyzing the same transaction in the same market(s) 
involving the same parties, conflicting decisions by different authorities are 
indefensible. 
                                                 
102  See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 414 (ABA 6th ed 2007) (“[W]here 
only a portion of the merged assets raises competition concerns, a divestiture or injunction may 
be confined to the assets related to the markets adversely affected.”) 
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This argument loses its force when the markets are not globalized and the 
authorities are analyzing the effects of the merger on their respective national 
markets. If a merger affects a particular national market in such a way that no 
remedy can alleviate the competitive harm, the competition authority should 
block the merger. While it may be frustrating for the proponents of a transaction 
to abort a merger simply because one jurisdiction objects to it, if an informed 
and well-supported economic analysis of the transaction demonstrates 
irremediable anticompetitive effects in a local market, the desire for uniformity 
cannot deny the local authority’s prerogative to protect its own market and 
consumers. Even for a full entity regulation, the argument for harmonization is 
not absolute. 
Regulation of restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance are both 
concerned with business conduct. They focus on business-to-business 
transactions and transactions with end consumers. They may restrict the 
production or distribution of a product or service, but they generally do not go 
directly to the content of the product or the substance of the service, as in the 
case of drug safety standards, and are hence more appropriately considered as 
process-based regulation.103 Regulation of restrictive agreements and abuse of 
dominance are not easily circumventable, if at all. The buyers in transactions 
regulated by these two areas of competition law are usually not very 
geographically mobile, at least not to a degree that permits forum shopping by 
the sellers. Therefore, the only accommodation strategy for firms often is 
compliance. 
While some of the transactions regulated by these two areas of competition 
law are global in scope, many of them are local in nature. International cartels, 
which have almost become the mainstay of international competition law, are 
often global in reach and involve firms from multiple continents. Meanwhile, 
many vertical restraint and abuse of dominance cases are confined to national 
markets. More importantly, to the extent that these types of practices are 
pursued on a cross-border basis, they can be segregated in response to local 
regulation. This segregability means that if jurisdictions were to have divergent 
rules on one type of business conduct, say, resale price maintenance, it would be 
possible for a multinational corporation to adjust its distribution policies to 
accommodate the variations. It is hence possible for firms to accommodate 
                                                 
103  One may argue that competition rules on, say, standard setting amount to product-based 
regulation, as they regulate technology standards that are incorporated in a product. However, it is 
important to remember that competition law does not directly mandate or regulate the type of 
technology standard adopted, but only how it is adopted. As such, it is still more appropriately 
characterized as process-based regulation. 
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regulatory inconsistencies, albeit with some costs. These costs could be saved if 
competition law were harmonized internationally. 
This is only half of the analysis, however. First, as suggested earlier, the 
significance of these potential savings depends on the degree of the globalization 
of the market at issue. If the relevant market is not genuinely globalized and 
firms still pursue localized distribution and marketing strategies, the savings will 
be less significant. Second, these savings will need to be balanced against the loss 
of national regulatory prerogative. Here is where the analysis becomes more 
complex. To the extent that one believes that competition law should only focus 
on economic factors,104 and its analysis is only guided by one or two economic 
goals, such as the maximization of economic efficiency or societal welfare of 
some kind, and to the extent that there is a uniform understanding of the 
meaning of these goals, one may expect jurisdictions to have relatively little 
difficulty in reaching a consensus on the calibration of regulatory objectives. The 
loss of national regulatory prerogative as a result of harmonization will not raise 
serious concerns. 
However, if these economic goals are in fact subject to different 
interpretations, if these interpretations are dependent on the stage of economic 
development and the socio-economic environment of the country at issue, if 
competition law does pursue non-economic goals, or at least non-market-related 
economic goals, if competition and markets are themselves not purely economic 
constructs and are conditioned by cultural norms, and if the enforcement 
infrastructure and general legal environment of a country is such that the rules 
designed for other, more advanced, jurisdictions cannot be effectively and 
impartially enforced in the local environment, then there are reasons to believe 
that a consensus on the calibration of regulatory objectives will be difficult to 
achieve. These possibilities suggest reasons to be concerned about the loss of 
national regulatory prerogative and cautious about pursuing global convergence 
of competition law. 
V.  DIVERGENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE GOALS OF 
COMPETITION LAW  
It was argued earlier that convergence would be more desirable and 
feasible if there was an international consensus on the objectives of competition 
law. As it turns out, such a consensus is lacking. There are disagreements as to 
                                                 
104  See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law vii–viii (Chicago 2d ed 2001) (rejecting Michael 
Jacobs’s view that the conflict between Chicago and post-Chicago schools of antitrust is 
ultimately a matter of political choice, while espousing the economic approach of the Chicago 
School); Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself at 134–160 (cited in note 78) 
(analyzing various theories of harm in antitrust from an economic perspective). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 466 Vol. 12 No. 2 
whether competition law should be a technocratic area of regulation that is 
purely based on economic analysis,105 or whether it should encompass other 
non-market or even non-economic goals.106 Some scholars have argued that 
there is an inherent political content in competition law that cannot be assumed 
away simply by the incorporation of economic analysis.107 Disagreement is not 
confined to the goals pursued by competition law. It extends to the definition of 
some of the fundamental concepts that serve as guideposts for competition law 
analysis. These concepts include consumer welfare, total welfare, and even 
competition itself. 
Even if one were to subscribe to the notion that competition law should be 
based entirely on economic theories, a technocratic conception of competition 
law by no means necessitates convergence. Budzinski has argued that “there 
neither is, nor can ever be, an ultimately ‘right’ competition theory.”108 There are 
often a few credible approaches in mainstream economics to some of the most 
controversial issues in competition law. In fact, he goes one step further and 
argues that even if jurisdictions apply the same economic approach and adopt a 
world welfare standard, they will arrive at divergent outcomes so long as there is 
asymmetric distribution of consumers and producers in different countries.109 
What follows is an exploration of these sources of disagreement and their 
implications for the drive for convergence.  
A.  Different Conceptions of Competition  
It is a basic tenet of competition law that it protects competition and not 
competitors.110 The question that naturally follows is: What is competition? 
Although both US and EU competition laws share the same professed goal of 
protecting competition, it has been argued that the two jurisdictions understand 
and apply the term differently. According to Professor Eleanor Fox, the US has 
tended to focus on whether a particular business practice restricts output or 
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raises prices, that is, whether competition is harmed is generally measured by its 
impact on allocative efficiency.111 In the EU, competition is harmed when 
“openness and access to markets on the merits” is impaired and the market 
mechanism is degraded.112 What constitutes harm to competition is potentially 
broader under the EU definition than under the American one. What ultimately 
accounts for this difference, she explains, is that there is greater faith in the 
efficiency and benignancy of business conduct in the US.113 She believes that 
both understandings of competition are consistent with the axiom that 
competition law protects competition and not competitors. Which 
understanding one adopts “is largely a matter of context and political economy 
perspective.”114 
The most intuitive understanding of competition, perhaps, is that it refers 
to the rivalry among firms to vie for consumers by offering lower prices and 
better-quality products. Competition law protects competition under the belief 
that rivalry among competitors drives progress in society. This belief in the 
inherent merit of competition is the most entrenched in the US, especially 
among the Chicago School scholars.115 The focus on the preservation of rivalry 
in the US is even more apparent when one compares the historical development 
of merger review law across the Atlantic. For years, the US merger review 
regime paid much closer attention to coordinated interaction than to unilateral 
effects. As a matter of fact, the section on unilateral effects in the US Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines was only added in 1992.116 Meanwhile, the EU has progressed 
in the opposite direction: EU merger control traditionally has focused on 
preventing the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Most of the 
early EU merger cases were concerned with dominance resulting from a 
merger.117 It was only when the European Community Merger Regulation was 
revised in 2004 that the substantive test became “significant impediment of 
effective competition.”118 The revision was made specifically to clarify that 
coordinated effects can be a basis for prohibiting a merger under EU law. 
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This belief in the inherent merit of competition, however, is not universally 
shared. Professor Ronald Dworkin has criticized then-Professor Richard 
Posner’s economic approach to the law, which espouses a belief in the markets, 
wealth maximization, and the rationality of the individual as premised on “purely 
‘protestant’ political values.”119 Professor Wolfgang Pape asserts that “[t]he 
concept of competition in the West is clearly linked to a certain degree of 
individualism, egoism and striving for personal wealth—‘values’ which, although not 
necessarily regarded as positive, are, according to the Western perception, 
immanent traits of human beings.”120 
This link between faith in competition and individualism has been affirmed 
by cross-cultural psychologist Geert Hofstede in his famous multinational study 
of cultural values in the late-1960s and early-1970s. Hofstede’s surveys and 
subsequent studies have repeatedly shown the US to be the most individualistic 
country in the world.121 Countries that share similar faith in competition, mainly 
other Anglo-Saxon countries, have also ranked highly on individualism.122 
According to cross-cultural value surveys, the US and the other Anglo-Saxon 
countries are clear outliers in their predilection for individualism. In light of the 
demonstrated link between individualism and a preference for rivalry, there are 
reasons to expect other countries not to share the same abiding faith in the 
inherent merit of competition. This may be especially true of cultures that have 
been traditionally known as collectivist. 
Pape has carefully documented the different understandings of competition 
in East Asian and Islamic cultures, and argued that these understandings 
generally diverge from Western conceptions of competition. Regarding Japan, 
Pape observes that the Japanese word for competition, kyoso, was only coined in 
the nineteenth century and consists of two Chinese characters, kyo and so.123 The 
first character stands for emulation and race, “whilst the second part ‘so’ . . . 
carries the negative meaning of dispute, quarrel and conflict.”124 According to 
Pape, “the Meiji-regime originally opposed the introduction of this term, since it 
did not reflect the traditional understanding of the harmony of ‘wa’, an old 
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symbol for Japan.”125 Regarding Islamic cultures, Pape notes that “egoism as an 
extreme form of Western individualism and as a fundamental principle of 
capitalism is alien to the Islamic tradition. The basic aim is not individual 
performance, but being part of the community.”126 Although competition is not 
inconsistent with Islamic thinking, “extreme accumulation of private wealth and 
power is forbidden.”127 Moreover, the Islamic concept of zakaet, which “gives 
those people who do not have the means to find a job or gain the necessary 
education, a legal claim to other people’s wealth,”128 may deter the drive for 
profit by individual entrepreneurs.129  
This discussion of the different attitudes toward competition is not meant 
to suggest that firms in these countries do not compete. They very much do. It 
is meant to illustrate that the belief in the inherent merit of competition may not 
be universally shared. In countries that do not share this belief, competition is 
generally considered a means to a higher end and not an end in itself. This 
higher end may be consumer welfare, economic development, national 
competitiveness, protection of employment, or other economic goals.130 It may 
be a combination of them. It even has been argued that fairness justifies the 
protection of competition.131 While these different conceptions of competition 
may not produce marked variations in the application of competition law in 
most cases, they do matter in the “hard” cases, where divergences between 
jurisdictions are most likely. In cases where the preservation of rivalry directly 
conflicts with the other goals of competition law, jurisdictions that hold 
fostering rivalry to be the overriding goal of competition law may reach a 
different outcome from that of jurisdictions that espouse a multiplicity of goals. 
And it is in these cases where calls for convergence are the most vociferous. 
In fact, one need not traverse between cultures and academic disciplines to 
encounter different conceptions of competition. Even economists from 
advanced jurisdictions have disagreed on its precise meaning and relevance. No 
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less than Gregory Werden, Senior Economic Counsel in the Antitrust Division 
of the US Department of Justice, has argued that “the word ‘competition’ is not 
understood to mean ‘rivalry’, but the product of it.”132 The implication is that 
competition is worth protecting not as a process, but for the benefits it brings. 
Other economists have posited negative externalities to competition, such as 
excessive entry costs and excessive product differentiation, which is particularly 
serious in oligopolistic markets featuring differentiated products.133 Compared to 
the neoclassical economists, the Ordoliberals from the Freiburg School are even 
more circumspect about unfettered competition. The Ordoliberals are 
concerned by the “‘inherent self-destructive tendency within competition . . . 
Ordoliberals are more sensitive to the political power of large companies . . . 
[and] have other goals apart from that of the efficient allocation of resources.’”134 
Thus while the Chicago School scholars firmly believe in the inherent merit of 
inter-firm rivalry, which has largely become the orthodoxy in competition law, 
this belief is not shared by all economists and certainly not by all cultures. 
B.  Consumer Welfare Versus Total  Welfare  
The disagreement is not confined to whether the competitive process 
should be protected in its own right. Consensus on whether consumer welfare 
or total welfare should be the relevant standard for analysis is equally elusive. In 
fact, commentators cannot even agree on the meaning of “consumer welfare.” 
While there is general agreement on what a total welfare standard attempts 
to maximize, namely, total surplus,135 the definition of consumer welfare is 
shrouded in controversy.136 Even if one agrees that consumer welfare is only 
confined to the economic concept of consumer surplus, there is the obvious 
question of who constitutes the consumers whose surplus is protected. Some 
argue that consumers should only include end consumers, while others, such as 
Professor Herbert Hovenkamp, believe that customers of all kinds should count 
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as consumers under the consumer welfare standard.137 It has been argued that 
under the former formulation of consumer welfare, a buyer cartel would be 
unobjectionable so long as the downstream retail market is competitive and the 
end consumers are unharmed.138 Those who find unpalatable the prospect of 
buyer cartels being upheld either argue that these cartels should be singled out 
for special condemnation even if consumer welfare only encompasses end 
consumers or that consumer welfare extends to intermediate customers as well. 
Beyond the disagreement about definition, the relative merits of consumer 
welfare versus total welfare remain unresolved. Professor Dennis Carlton 
believes that total welfare is a superior standard for competition law analysis for 
a number of reasons. First, the consumer welfare standard tends to undervalue 
dynamic efficiency gains by overemphasizing short-run price reductions.139 
Second, using the consumer welfare standard as a means of wealth redistribution 
is misleading because most competition law cases involve disputes between 
firms, and firm profits flow back to consumers in the form of dividends.140 
Finally, Carlton argues that buyer cartels and monopsony power should raise no 
competitive concerns under a true consumer welfare standard.141 Carlton’s 
preference for the total welfare standard is shared by none other than Nobel 
Laureate Oliver Williamson, who, in a famous 1968 article, forcefully argues in 
favor of a total welfare standard for merger review.142 
Russell Pittman of the US Department of Justice rejects the total welfare 
standard for merger review, arguing that such a standard will inevitably carry a 
systemic bias for producer surplus.143 He also questions the validity of a 
common rejoinder by proponents of the total welfare standard that any bias for 
firms inherent in such a standard can be offset by transfer payments and other 
government policies.144 Pittman argues that until effective government policy is 
in place to address the severe income inequality that afflicts most nations, “it 
seems quite reasonable to argue that those making and enforcing other public 
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policies, like antitrust enforcement, should, to the degree manageable, take into 
account the distributional implications of their actions.”145 
The debate is further complicated when one moves beyond the theoretical 
merits of the two standards to implementation issues. Professors Damien Neven 
and Lars-Hendrik Röller conclude that a consumer welfare standard is generally 
superior for merger review purposes when lobbying by business interests is 
efficient and agency accountability low.146 This observation is echoed by 
Carlton.147 Professors David Besanko and Daniel Spülber similarly came out in 
favor of the consumer welfare standard, mostly on the grounds of the 
information asymmetry between the enforcement agency and the firms.148 
The unresolved debate about the relative merits of the two welfare 
standards casts doubt on the feasibility of convergence across the globe. The 
emerging jurisdictions may rightfully question which standard they should adopt 
when the established jurisdictions themselves cannot reach a consensus. This is 
evidenced by Werden’s observation that the 1992 US Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines seem to have left the issue of welfare standard intentionally vague.149 
This vagueness persists despite the common belief that US antitrust law 
generally espouses the consumer welfare standard.150 
The choice of welfare standard may have critical implications for 
developing countries, and it may incorporate different considerations from those 
facing developed nations. In developing countries, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) often play a pivotal role in alleviating poverty. There is a 
strong argument that surplus redounding to these firms should be given weight 
by their competition laws, which militates in favor of a total welfare standard. 
Meanwhile, given that many of the consumers in developing countries, especially 
those in markets for foodstuffs and other basic necessities, are likely to be poor, 
their welfare deserves extra protection. If Pittman is right in saying that there is 
an inherent pro-business bias in a total welfare standard, developing countries 
may better serve their citizens’ interests by adopting a consumer welfare 
standard. A full investigation of the appropriate welfare standard for developing 
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countries is beyond the scope of this Article. In light of the continual 
disagreement within the established jurisdictions about the appropriate welfare 
standard, and the special considerations facing developing countries in making 
the choice, there is little reason to expect jurisdictions to converge on a common 
welfare standard in the foreseeable future. 
C. Competition Law as Technocratic Regulation  
A more fundamental disagreement concerns whether competition law is a 
technocratic area of regulation that is purely concerned with economic issues or 
whether it encompasses non-economic goals. Under the technocratic view of 
competition law, competition law is about microeconomic issues presented by 
the relevant markets at issue. Competition law cases are decided based on the 
market effects of a business practice according to some benchmark for 
economic performance, such as economic efficiency or some measure of societal 
welfare.151 
This is by no means the only possible or plausible conception of 
competition law. Even if one accepts that competition law is concerned with 
economics, it need not be confined to microeconomic issues. For instance, the 
competition law of some jurisdictions, such as Canada and South Africa, 
explicitly requires effects on employment and national competitiveness to be 
taken into account.152 Employment and national competitiveness are excluded 
from the purview of competition law in the technocratic tradition, but are 
nonetheless important macroeconomic objectives. Different jurisdictions may 
have divergent expectations about what economic goals should be served by 
their competition laws. Those that do not consider competition as an end worth 
protecting in its own right are more likely to incorporate non-market related 
goals in their competition laws. These divergent expectations are reflected in the 
ICN’s Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of 
Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies, which lists the 
following as the objectives of unilateral conduct laws of ICN member 
jurisdictions: “ensure effective competitive process as a goal and/or a means, 
promote consumer welfare, maximize efficiency, ensure economic freedom, 
ensure a level playing field for SMEs, promote fairness and equality, promote 
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consumer choice, achieve market integration, facilitate privatization and market 
liberalization, and promote international competitiveness.”153 Most of these goals 
are deemed unacceptable by the technocratic tradition of competition law, yet 
numerous jurisdictions pursue them in their abuse of dominance laws. 
Beyond economic goals, some commentators have argued that there is an 
inherent political content in competition law and believe that competition law 
may properly pursue political and social goals. For instance, Professor Barry 
Rodger asserts that “competition law is not necessarily solely concerned with the 
fulfillment of economic ideals;” politics and economics “have played [a 
significant role] in the formation of competition policy.”154 He proceeds to 
enumerate a number of political objectives that may be pursued by competition 
law, including the control of the excessive concentration of economic power, 
regional policy, and market integration, which is particularly relevant to the 
EU.155 One important non-economic goal pursued by EU competition law is 
market integration. The European courts’ hostility toward vertical territorial 
restrictions and ban on parallel imports can be best understood from the 
perspective of fostering the internal market.156 While market integration may be 
viewed as an economic policy in general, in the European context, it is intimately 
related to the political integration of the EU that began as an attempt to prevent 
the European nations from descending into a self-destructive war again. Market 
integration is thus as much a political as an economic enterprise in Europe. 
On the other side of the Atlantic, Professor Robert Pitofsky, former 
Chairman of the US FTC, famously asserted that “[i]t is bad history, bad policy, 
and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting the antitrust 
laws.”157 These political values include the antidemocratic political impulses that 
may result from an excessive economic concentration of power and the pressure 
on the state to play a more intrusive role in the economic affairs of an economy 
dominated by a few giants.158 The US Supreme Court has voiced a similar 
concern about the political ramifications of anticompetitive conduct. It has 
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justified the protection of the competitive process with political and social 
values, noting in the Northern Pacific case that: 
[t]he Sherman Act . . . rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction 
of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic 
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material 
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the 
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.159 
Consideration of broader economic and non-economic goals does not 
require the wholesale displacement of market-related goals from competition 
law. This Article in no way argues that competition law should be preoccupied 
with broader economic and non-economic goals. Ensuring employment or 
promoting national competitiveness should not be the primary foci of 
competition law, nor should competition law be principally concerned with 
fairness or the broader political implications of economic concentration. The 
main concerns of competition law should be the protection of the competitive 
process and the enhancement of societal welfare. Being the chief focus, 
however, does not require being the exclusive focus. Non-market-related goals 
may have a role to play on the margin. In cases where the arguments based on 
welfare or efficiency are close, there is room for considering these secondary 
goals. In other words, these secondary goals could be treated as tiebreakers in 
close cases.160 Some jurisdictions choose to exclude these secondary goals 
entirely, while some adopt a broader conception of the goals of their 
competition laws. Within the latter group, each jurisdiction may accord different 
weights to these broader non-market goals. There is no one correct approach. 
This multitude of possible approaches poses a serious dilemma for convergence. 
It increases the costs resulting from the loss of national regulatory prerogative by 
reducing the ability of jurisdictions to ascertain the correct balance of goals for 
themselves, thus rendering it less likely that the benefits of convergence will 
outweigh its costs. 
D.  Implications for Convergence  
What are the implications of the foregoing discussion for convergence? 
There is little salience for procedural convergence, at least concerning what has 
been contemplated thus far, namely, the procedures for merger review. The 
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implication for substantive convergence, however, is clear. If countries attribute 
different goals, some economic and some non-economic, to competition law, 
and there is no consensus on the scope and relative weight of each of these 
goals, substantive convergence will be difficult to achieve. 
A country that does not share the belief in the inherent merit of 
competition and is instead more concerned with the excessive concentration of 
economic power will pay less attention to collusive conduct and focus more on 
abuses of dominance. A jurisdiction that adopts a total welfare standard on the 
grounds that its producers are equally worthy of protection as its consumers, 
especially in markets where the producers are drawn from the underprivileged 
classes in society, will decide a potentially anticompetitive merger with promises 
of considerable efficiency gains differently from a jurisdiction applying the 
consumer welfare standard. A jurisdiction espousing the consumer welfare 
standard may show relative leniency to buyer cartels and monopsonists so long 
as the end consumers are unharmed. Different conceptions about competition, 
the appropriate welfare standards and their applications, and the permissible 
scope of non-market goals in competition law may result in substantive 
divergences. 
With respect to normative convergence, disagreement on these issues itself 
constitutes normative disagreement. Whether competition is inherently 
beneficial, whether producers’ interests deserve protection, whether competition 
law should pursue distributive goals, and whether competition law should be 
concerned about excessive accumulation of economic power are themselves 
normative issues, each of which bears on competition law enforcement. It was 
asserted earlier that law must not be detached from the social and cultural norms 
of a jurisdiction, lest it lose legitimacy.161 To the extent that the diversity of goals 
contained in competition laws across the globe reflects the prevailing social and 
cultural norms about competition in the various jurisdictions, there exist 
significant normative divergences, which in turn render substantive convergence 
difficult to achieve. 
VI.  DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONVERGENCE  
The discussion thus far has largely focused on established jurisdictions. It is 
argued that disparate views on the goals of competition law pose great obstacles 
to convergence. Global consensus becomes even more elusive once developing 
countries are brought into the picture. Policy goals that are particularly relevant 
to these countries include economic development, poverty reduction, and 
inclusive growth—growth that benefits not only the elite but also the general 
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population. These are goals that have not been given particular priority in the 
industrialized nations and have not been explicitly incorporated into their 
approaches to competition law. The different economic environment in 
developing countries—such as the lack of market dynamism; the prevalence of 
corruption and cronyism; the need to offer assistance to SMEs, which hold the 
key to poverty alleviation; the prominence of the informal economy; and the 
lack of innovative capacity—may call for different emphases in competition law 
analysis from that of industrialized nations. 
A.  Special  Characteristics of Developing Economies  
Serious poverty and income inequality are prevalent in many developing 
economies. These phenomena present two main challenges to developing 
countries as far as competition law enforcement is concerned. One is the need 
to encourage entrepreneurship to promote inclusive growth; the other is the 
need to protect impoverished consumers from exploitative practices. A number 
of commentators, including Fox, have argued that developing countries must 
pursue inclusive growth that will alleviate poverty and reduce income 
inequality.162 Inclusive growth requires opportunities for upward economic 
mobility, an important avenue for which is entrepreneurship.163 For those who 
are at the bottom of the economic ladder in a developing country, often the only 
way to break out of poverty is to start their own businesses, which are going to 
be, at least initially, SMEs. Therefore, encouragement of entrepreneurship and 
assistance to SMEs must be a central pillar in every inclusive growth strategy. If 
competition law is to complement an inclusive growth strategy, it must afford 
SMEs stronger protection than is customary in established jurisdictions and be 
particularly vigilant against abuse of dominance. This is especially so because 
dominant firms in developing countries are often former state monopolies that 
still benefit from official patronage or informal connections to the state. Their 
privileged positions make it even harder for new private firm rivals to compete 
with them.  
                                                 
162  See Fox, 13 Sw J L & Trade Am at 216–20 (cited in note 81). 
163  See Leora Klapper, Raphael Amit, and Mauro F. Guillen, Entrepreneurship and Firm Formation Across 
Countries *2 (World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Snapshots Feb 2008), online at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFR/Resources/475459-
1222364030476/FirmFormation_NBER.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2011); Inter-American Development 
Bank, Private Sector Development Strategy *4 (March 12, 2004), online at 
www.iadb.org/document.cfm?id=352366 (visited Oct 25, 2011); United Nations Development 
Programme, Unleashing Entrepreneurship **5–9 (March 1, 2004), online at 
www.undp.org/cpsd/documents/report/english/fullreport.pdf (visited Oct 25, 2011). 
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The poorest in many developing countries live below the poverty line and 
often scrape by with no more than a dollar or two a day.164 They are often 
malnourished, sick, and illiterate, which severely curtails their productivity and 
ability to improve their economic well-being. Therefore, an inclusive growth 
strategy must include policies to combat malnourishment, poor health, and 
illiteracy. While the bulk of the responsibility will fall on government programs 
that directly confront these problems, competition law has a role to play. 
Competition law enforcement may focus on goods that have the most direct 
impact on the nutritional, health, and educational needs of the poorest in 
developing countries. Anticompetitive conduct in these sectors should be dealt 
with harshly.  
Beyond that, developing country competition authorities may consider 
taking a tougher stance on exploitative practices by dominant firms. This is 
despite the fact that most established jurisdictions, especially the US, have largely 
left exploitative practices out of the purview of competition law.165 The usual 
justification for this stance is two-fold. First, there is a serious implementation 
problem of distinguishing between very high prices and excessive prices.166 Such 
distinctions are notoriously difficult to draw. The inability to do so undermines 
effective enforcement and legal certainty for firms seeking to comply with the 
law. Second, there is the theoretical objection that the opportunity to reap 
temporary monopoly profit spurs firms to compete and innovate.167 In the 
industrialized nations, the general view is that consumers are able to bear 
momentary high prices, which will be eroded once a new competitor enters the 
market. Short-run monopolistic prices are the price that consumers pay for the 
benefit of keener long-run competition and innovation. While consumers in 
developed nations may be in a position to withstand such high prices, the 
poorest consumers in developing countries are not. Any extra cost for a basic 
necessity will have a direct and severe impact on their overall standard of living. 
For example, 10 percent more spent on foodstuffs may require consumers to 
                                                 
164  See World Bank, Extreme Poverty Rates Continue to Fall (June 2, 2010), online at 
http://data.worldbank.org/news/extreme-poverty-rates-continue-to-fall (visited Oct 5, 2011). 
165  See Verizon Comm Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 US 398, 407 (2004); Berkey Photo, 
Inc v Eastman Kodak Co, 603 F2d 263, 296 (2d Cir 1979). 
166  See Michal S. Gal, Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the US and the EC: Two Systems of Belief 
about Monopoly?, 49 Antitrust Bull 343, 367, 373–74 (2004). 
167 Trinko, 540 US at 407 (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging 
of monopoly prices, is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market 
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts 
‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic 
growth.”). 
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remove their children from school.168 The plight of these consumers therefore 
may justify a more assertive stance on exploitative practices in markets for basic 
necessities. 
Dynamic markets are less likely to be found in developing countries than in 
industrialized nations. Most sectors of developing country economies are 
dominated by a handful of firms.169 The lack of a well-functioning capital 
market, which is the case in many developing countries, means that new entrants 
may have difficulty in obtaining financing.170 The dearth of skilled human capital 
may constrain a new firm’s ability to establish itself and compete. Rapid market 
entry is hence by no means assured. Even if a new firm successfully establishes a 
foothold in the market, it may be no match for the well-funded and well-
connected incumbent firms. This means that Justice Scalia’s pronouncement in 
Verizon Comm Inc v Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,171 that temporary 
monopoly profit could be beneficial because it attracts new market entrants and 
entrepreneurial activities, rings hollow in developing countries.172 There may be 
no market entry in response to the existence of monopolistic profit. This lack of 
market dynamism has important implications for regulating abuse of dominance 
in developing countries. It calls for a more aggressive abuse of dominance 
enforcement agenda. The dearth of potential market entrants means that 
incumbents will have greater incentive to harm existing rivals, as the payoff will 
be substantial after existing rivals are eliminated. It also means that it is more 
important to protect these competitors, as they are vital, perhaps even 
indispensable, to keeping the market competitive.173 
Most developing countries possess little of what development economists 
call innovative capacity: the ability to come up with novel products or 
                                                 
168  For example, in Nepal, households that have experienced food price increases over the last three 
months were most likely to use education-related coping mechanisms, with 14 percent taking their 
children out of school for work. See UNICEF, Department of Education, and Research Input 
and Development Action, 3F Crisis: Impact on Education, Quarterly Monitoring Report *1 (July–
Sept 2009). 
169  See James Tybout, Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries: How Well Do They Do, and Why?, 38 J 
Econ Lit 1, 16 (2000); Philippe Brusick and Simon J. Evenett, Should Developing Countries Worry 
about Abuse of Dominant Power?, 2008 Wis L Rev 269, 276 (2008). 
170  Thorsten Beck and Asil Demirguc-Kunt, Access to Finance: An Unfinished Agenda, 22 World Bank 
Econ Rev 3 (2008); Brusick and Evenett, Should Developing Countries Worry about Abuse of Dominant 
Power? at 276 (cited in note 169); Tybout, Manufacturing Firms in Developing Countries at 6 (cited in 
note 169). 
171  540 US 398 (2004). 
172  See id at 402. 
173  See Fox, 26 World Competition at 163–64 (cited in note 111). 
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production processes.174 Most of them possess no more than imitative capacity, 
that is, the ability to imitate a technology that has been invented elsewhere, 
usually a developed country.175 The lack of innovative capacity means that the 
social calculus behind the grant of patent protection needs to be recalibrated. If 
there are no inventors to take advantage of the innovation incentives offered by 
the patent system, competition law rules on intellectual property exploitation 
need not be as deferential to the preservation of innovation incentives as their 
developed country counterparts. This is a crucial qualification to the patent-
competition interface because the need to preserve innovation incentives is the 
most forceful argument offered to defend potentially anticompetitive patent 
exploitation practices in developed nations. This means that developing 
countries may have greater leeway in regulating these practices. 
Many developing countries have pursued industrial policy as a growth 
strategy. There has been much academic discussion about the merits of such 
policy. Some notable commentators, such as Professors Michael Porter and 
Simon Evenett, have cast serious doubt on the efficacy of industrial policy, while 
others take a more sanguine view of it.176 This Article does not attempt to 
resolve the debate. Instead, it focuses on the ramifications of industrial policy on 
competition law enforcement. To the extent that industrial policy is in place, 
competition law analysis needs to take into account how such policy distorts the 
competitive dynamics of the markets.177 This may require adjustment in 
enforcement priority or even legal principles. 
Lastly, one must give explicit recognition to the political environment and 
resource limitations facing many developing countries. As mentioned earlier, 
many developing countries are afflicted by serious corruption and cronyism. The 
independence and reliability of their competition law enforcement infrastructure 
                                                 
174  For application of the concepts of innovative and imitative capacities, see Edwin Lai, International 
Intellectual Property Rights Protection and the Rate of Product Innovation, 55 J Dev Econ 133 (1998); 
Carmelo Pierpaolo Parello, A North-South Model of Intellectual Property Rights Protection and Skill 
Accumulation, 85 J Dev Econ 253 (2008). The relative strength of industrialized nations in research 
and development (R&D) and innovation is attested to by the fact that they account for a vast 
majority of global R&D expenditure. Developing countries only contributed 24 percent of the 
global R&D expenditure in 2007. If China is excluded, the figure drops to 14.8 percent. See 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Global Investments in R&D, 15 UIS Fact Sheet 3 (2011). 
175  See Correa, Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing Countries at 5 (cited in note 64). 
176  See Simon J. Evenett, Lessons From the Six Country Analyses, in Brooks and Evenett, eds, Competition 
Policy and Development in Asia (MacMillan 2005); Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A 
Productivity-Based Approach 339, 346–49 (2002), online at 
http://www.isc.hbs.edu/053002antitrust.pdf (visited Nov 11, 2011). 
177  For an overview of industrial policy in general, see Maroi Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, and Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, eds, Industrial Policy and Development: The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation (Oxford 
2009). 
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cannot be taken for granted. Even if the officials were honest and independent 
in their application of the law, they may face serious limitations in their 
resources and expertise. Many of them have not received extensive training in 
competition law and industrial organization economics.178 Even if the 
enforcement authority possesses the expertise, the judiciary most likely does 
not.179 This greatly limits the sophistication of the analysis that can be 
incorporated into the competition law regimes of developing countries. 
B.  Implications for Convergence  
The important question, again, is: What are the implications of these 
economic and political characteristics of developing countries for the 
convergence of competition law? The implications for procedural and normative 
convergences are likely to be limited.180 The relevance for substantive 
convergence, however, is immense. On a more general level, if developing 
countries are to take poverty alleviation and the pursuit of inclusive growth 
seriously, they may need to adopt a more interventionist approach to 
competition law enforcement than has been practiced in established 
jurisdictions. Fox and Rodger have both noted that a non-interventionist 
enforcement approach generally preserves the existing distribution of wealth and 
economic structure.181 This is obviously undesirable for developing countries, 
many of which have deleteriously unequal wealth distribution.182 
The lack of expertise, experience, and resources in the enforcement 
infrastructure means that bright-line rules, as opposed to nuanced rule of reason 
analysis, may be more appropriate.183 This may reduce the range of analytical 
options at the disposal of the enforcement authority when tackling a 
                                                 
178  See Brusick and Evenett, 2008 Wis L Rev at 293 (cited in note 169). 
179  See id at 279–80. 
180  These characteristics are unlikely to have much relevance for the harmonization of merger review 
procedures. Their relevance may be greater for procedural convergence in other areas of 
competition law, especially the relative lack of expertise and resources in the enforcement 
infrastructure.  
181  See Rodger, 6 Colum J Eur L at 297 (cited in note 81); Fox, 13 Sw J L & Trade Am at 215 (cited 
in note 81). 
182  See Xubei Luo and Nong Zhu, Rising Income Inequality in China: A Race to the Top **3, 7 (World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4700 Aug 2008), online at 
http://library1.nida.ac.th/worldbankf/fulltext/wps04700.pdf (visited Oct 30, 2011) (analyzing 
increasing income inequality in China in recent years); J. Humberto Lopez and Guillermo Perry, 
Inequality in Latin America: Determinants and Consequences (World Bank Policy Research Paper 4504 
Feb 2008), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090391 (visited Nov 
6, 2011) (reviewing causes for income inequality in Latin America). 
183  See Fox, 13 Sw J L & Trade Am at 230 (cited in note 81). 
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competition law issue. For instance, a per se approach for resale price 
maintenance may be more suitable for developing countries. While the majority 
in Leegin forcefully argued that RPMs are procompetitive in a sufficient number 
of instances that per se treatment is not appropriate,184 most developing 
countries do not have the resources to devote to the investigation and analysis of 
every instance of RPM. If a sufficient proportion of RPMs is anticompetitive, 
such jurisdictions should opt for a per se rule. 
The choice of welfare standard in merger review may similarly need to be 
adjusted. To the extent that the authority’s independence is in doubt, Neven and 
Röller have argued that a consumer welfare standard will be more appropriate.185 
This is because the pro-consumer bias of the standard will counteract the 
effective lobbying by business interests, thereby creating a more balanced 
outcome. Market dynamism also affects the choice of welfare standard in merger 
review. Professor Bruce Lyons has demonstrated that a consumer welfare 
standard is generally preferable only when the market is large and there are 
alternative efficiency-enhancing mergers available in the market. He notes that 
“[i]f there are only two firms, the [total welfare standard] is always superior 
because the proposed merger has no alternatives.”186 The relative weight of these 
considerations is likely to vary by country, or perhaps even by market.187 
The characteristics of developing countries require adjustments to specific 
competition law doctrines and principles. While it may be argued that these 
characteristics can be adequately taken into account by shifting enforcement 
priorities, only doctrinal changes can adequately reflect these characteristics. 
Take the patent-competition interface as an example. The lack of innovative 
capacity in a developing country means that patent competition law rules need to 
pay much less attention to innovation incentives, and there are much weaker 
reasons to incur short-term consumer welfare loss to generate these incentives. 
More concretely, this may mean that unilateral refusal to license is more 
susceptible to challenges in developing countries than in developed nations. This 
may be especially so if the product at issue is a basic necessity, the access to 
which significantly contributes to poverty alleviation and improved well-being of 
the poor. A more interventionist approach to unilateral refusal to license 
                                                 
184  See Leegin, 551 US at 886–907. 
185  See Neven and Röller, 23 Intl J Indust Org at 831 (cited in note 146). 
186  Bruce R. Lyons, Could Politicians Be More Right than Economists? A Theory of Merger Standards *21 
(Revised CCR Working Paper 02-1 2002), online at www.uea.ac.uk/polopoly_fs/1.104451!ccr02-
1revised.pdf (visited Nov 6, 2011). 
187  The choice of a different welfare standard depending on the number of firms in the market is 
unlikely to be feasible and will be open to criticisms on fairness concerns. Therefore, developing 
countries are likely to be required to take market dynamism into account by examining their 
domestic markets on an aggregate basis.  
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intellectual property would not be possible with a mere adjustment in 
enforcement priorities. It would require a doctrinal shift that may preclude 
substantive convergence on this prominent issue in competition law.  
Another possible divergence from the established jurisdictions is more 
robust enforcement against abuse of dominance. This is necessitated by the need 
to provide special assistance to SMEs, the lack of market dynamism, and the 
need to protect consumers from exploitative practices. For example, in the 
context of predatory pricing, stagnant markets mean that the requirement for 
proof of a reasonable likelihood of recoupment of lost profit may be overly 
stringent. Preservation of existing competitors may need to be accorded greater 
weight if subsequent market entry in response to price increases by the 
successful predator is unlikely to materialize. Once the existing competitors have 
been driven out of the market, the predating firm may face no further threats to 
its dominance. The diversity of possible approaches to abuses of dominance, 
such as predatory pricing, is affirmed by Budzinski’s observation that 
microeconomics and competition theories do not propound a single view on 
whether a long-run decrease in market contestability is justified by short-run 
price cuts.188 Jurisdictions may legitimately differ on whether such a justification 
is acceptable based on the preferences of society at large.  
To the extent that a developing country has pursued industrial policies that 
shield domestic firms from foreign competitors, leaving the domestic markets 
uncompetitive, the competition authority should be more vigilant against 
collusion, both express and tacit, by the domestic firms. In a stable market 
populated by a small number of firms and protected by government barriers, 
tacit collusion may be particularly easy to achieve.189 This may be especially so if 
the domestic firms maintain close ties with government officials, who may 
directly or indirectly facilitate collusion. The possible increased incidence of tacit 
collusion means that the hurdle for successful prosecution of such conduct will 
need to be lowered. The authority may consider relaxing the standard of proof 
for tacit collusion, perhaps by dropping the so-called “plus factors” from the 
elements of proof.190 
This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive list of possible 
divergences necessitated by the characteristics by developing countries. Instead, 
                                                 
188  See Budzinski, The Governance of Global Competition at 44 (cited in note 31). 
189  See Lawrence A. Sullivan and Warren S. Grimes, The Law of Antitrust: An Integrated Handbook 172–
74 (West 2000). 
190  “Plus factors” are additional facts that the plaintiff may prove to strengthen the inference of 
collusion from merely parallel conduct. They include “an oligopolistic market structure, advance 
posting of parallel prices, a history of price fixing or exchange of price information.” Hovenkamp, 
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice at 175 (cited in note 150). 
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it seeks to demonstrate that there are so many fundamental differences in the 
way that markets, the economy, the judiciary, and the political system function in 
developed and developing countries that it is unrealistic to expect the same 
competition law rules to apply effectively to both of them. If one believes that 
competition law principles should reflect their surrounding socio-economic 
environment, substantive divergences instead of convergences should be the 
norm. 
VII.  CULTURAL VARIATIONS AND CONVERGENCE  
The last, and perhaps most controversial, obstacle to convergence is the 
need to take into account how cultural norms affect competition and market 
behavior. Neoclassical economics and industrial organization, which has 
underpinned the theoretical development and application of competition law for 
a large part of the last thirty years, posits that consumers and firms are rational 
and operate in a utility- or profit-maximizing manner. Over the last decade or so, 
behavioral economists have challenged this fundamental assumption of 
neoclassical economics, arguing that individuals do not always act in a rational 
manner.191 One implication of this stream of research is that consumers and 
managers can no longer be assumed to be Homo Oeconomicus, reacting in the 
same rational way to market events across cultures.  
A.  Cultural Norms and Competition  
Sociologists and cross-cultural psychologists such as Geert Hofstede and 
Shalom Schwartz have long recognized that cultural norms affect economic 
behavior. Hofstede defines culture as “the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one group from another.”192 He measures business culture 
along four dimensions: masculinity versus femininity, individualism versus 
collectivism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance.193 The first three 
                                                 
191  See, for example, Maurice E. Stucke and Amanda P. Reeves, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 Ind L J 1527, 
1570 (2011). See generally Cass R. Sunstein, ed, Behavioral Law and Economics (2000). 
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dimensions in particular have been shown to influence attitude toward 
competition. Cultures that are individualistic, masculine, and uncertainty-tolerant 
generally hold a more positive attitude about competition.194 Meanwhile, 
collectivist, feminine, and uncertainty-avoiding cultures tend to prefer 
collaboration and eschew hard-nosed competition.195 
In addition, cultural and historical development has been shown to affect 
the prevailing norms of industrial organization. Richard Whitley has 
demonstrated the links between the common forms of industrial organization in 
the major East Asian countries, namely keiretsu in Japan, chaebols in South Korea, 
and family businesses in the Chinese-speaking world, and their respective 
historical institutional environments. He observes that the “strong separation of 
ownership from control in large Japanese kaisha reflects the combination of 
integrated vertical loyalties, political and economic differentiation and 
decentralization and patterns of village organization in Tokugawa Japan.”196 
Market dynamics have similarly been influenced by historical development in 
Japan.197 Whitley notes that relational contracting in Japan is less dependent on 
personal ties than it is in China. The relatively impersonal connections between 
firms are built instead on collective corporate identities. This, again, was 
attributed to the governance structure in historical Japan. 
B.  Implications for Substantive Convergence  
Cultural considerations may engender substantive divergences in 
competition law. Social scientists have noted that trust, which is the 
quintessential building block of cartels, is formed and maintained differently in 
various cultures. Doney, Cannon, and Mullen argue that trust is less likely to 
form in an individualistic and masculine society because of the greater incidence 
of self-serving and opportunistic behavior, which is deemed more acceptable in 
                                                                                                                              
people’s lifetime continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty.” Id at 225. 
Lastly, a “masculine society” is one in which social gender roles are clearly distinct. There is 
greater emphasis on assertiveness, toughness, and material success, at least if they are exhibited 
and pursued by men. A “feminine society” is one in which social gender roles overlap: “[b]oth 
men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.” Id at 
297. 
194  See Hofstede and Bond, 16 Org Dynamics at 10–15 (cited in note 32). But see Eva G. Green, 
Jean-Claude Deschamp, and Dario Paez, Variation of Individualism and Collectivism within and between 
20 Countries: A Typological Analysis, 36 J Cross-Cultural Psych 321, 334 (2005) (finding that 
“competitiveness can be associated with both individualism and collectivism because it appeared 
combined with both self-reliance and group-oriented interdependence”).  
195  See Hofstede and Bond, 16 Organizational Dynamics at 10–15 (cited in note 32). 
196  Richard Whitley, Business Systems in East Asia: Firms, Markets and Societies 171 (Sage 1992).  
197  See id at 174–77. 
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such a society than in a more collectivist society.198 Moreover, the social sanction 
for such behavior is likely to be higher in a more collectivist society than in a 
more individualistic society. To the extent that individuals are highly trusting or 
collectivist in certain cultures, which has been found to be the case in some East 
Asian countries, cartel enforcement may need to be emphasized.199 
There are reasons to believe that leniency programs may work less well in 
collectivist cultures. Defection is likely to be frowned upon, given the social ties 
among business executives in the same industry and the general aversion to 
confrontations in such cultures. Not only will the defecting firm likely be 
expelled from the trade association, but the business executives involved will 
also likely be socially ostracized and lose business connections.200 In order to 
increase the attractiveness of leniency and induce defection, criminal sanctions 
may be necessary. Only when the cost of belated defection is prohibitively high, 
as in the case of imprisonment, will firms break away from their cartels and take 
advantage of leniency programs. Cultural considerations may thus bolster the 
case for criminalization in more collectivist cultures.201 
Tacit collusion is similarly facilitated by the prevalence of trust and a 
collectivist mentality, which means that the determination of the existence of 
tacit collusion, may also require adjustment. One crucial difference between 
cartels and tacit collusion is that the co-conspirators do not explicitly negotiate 
with one another in the case of the latter. They must be able to reach terms of 
understanding among themselves tacitly. In more collectivist cultures, tacit 
understanding can be more easily attained: Co-conspirators can decipher and 
predict each other’s conduct with less uncertainty as the range of possible 
conduct and motives will be narrower.202 A lower burden of proof for 
substantiating a claim of tacit collusion may be appropriate. One may go even 
further and reverse the burden of proof once the plaintiff has provided evidence 
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of parallel conduct. Once such evidence is furnished, the burden shifts to the 
defendant to negate the existence of tacit collusion.  
Cultural factors may also be pertinent to the treatment of facilitating 
practices such as information exchanges. The general concern about these 
practices is that they may facilitate collusion.203 It follows that in cultures where 
collusion is already easier to achieve, facilitating practices should be subject to 
closer scrutiny. Price information circulated and price recommendations issued 
by trade associations are more likely to lead to alignment in prices in countries 
with a highly collectivist culture. Leaders of trade associations may hold greater 
sway over their fellow members’ business decisions. Competition authorities in 
these countries hence may need to adopt a stricter standard for facilitating 
practices. 
Incorporation of cultural considerations in the design of competition law 
does not imply a wholesale repudiation of the primacy of industrial organization 
economics in competition law analysis. Far from it. Nor is it intended to imply 
that there are fundamental differences in the way the competitive process 
operates across countries. Firms and consumers largely behave in a similar 
fashion across cultures. The differences are in degree rather than in kind. 
However, there are instances where these minor differences may matter in how 
competition law analyzes certain competitive conduct. These differences may 
again call for divergent outcomes in the hard cases. Cultural considerations 
hence may necessitate substantive divergences and limit the feasibility of 
substantive convergence across the board. 
C. Cultures and the Pursuit of Normative Convergence  
Cultural considerations have even greater relevance for normative 
convergence than substantive convergence. Differences in cultural norms 
regarding competition directly bear on normative convergence. In some 
countries, there is a general lack of awareness, both within the general public and 
the bureaucracy, of the benefits of competition. If the awareness exists, it is 
weak and easily retreats in the face of competing policy objectives. For example, 
some countries have permitted the formation of cartels in the pursuit of 
industrial policy.204 Government officials were even directly or indirectly 
involved in the formation of these cartels. For example, when sales tax was first 
introduced in Japan in 1989, the government allowed small and medium-sized 
businesses to fix prices so that they could pass on the tax burden to 
                                                 
203  See Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice at 180 (cited in note 
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consumers.205 There is much discussion within the international competition 
community about the inculcation of a “competition culture.”206 There is growing 
recognition that competition law will not achieve its full potential if it is not 
supported by a culture in which there is general appreciation of the benefits of 
competition.207 Competition law enforcement will not gain legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public and receive the support it needs from the rest of the government 
and society at large. In this sense, efforts to promote normative convergence are 
to be welcomed. 
It was argued earlier that a belief in the inherent merit of competition is not 
shared across the globe. Social scientists have found that countries that are more 
individualistic and uncertainty-tolerant are more likely to embrace competition. 
If efforts to promote a “competition culture” are to be welcomed, how far 
should such efforts go? Should we endeavor to raise the receptiveness to 
competition to that of the individualistic and uncertainty-tolerant cultures? 
There are reasons to believe that such an ambitious agenda is both unlikely to 
succeed and ill-advised. It is unlikely to succeed because cultural norms and 
values are notoriously impervious to change. Social scientists have shown that 
cultures tend to remain very stable over time.208 While minor shifts are possible, 
significant changes are very difficult to achieve. 
More importantly, such an ambitious agenda is ill-advised because attempts 
to harmonize cultural norms regarding competition presume a uniquely optimal 
level of belief in competition for all countries. Whether such an optimal level 
exists is open to dispute. A minimal level of faith in competition must prevail for 
markets to reap the benefits of competition. For example, it is a commonplace 
assumption in competition law that cartels are harmful to consumers. This is a 
reflection of the fundamental belief that firms are expected to compete and that 
such competition will benefit consumers. The aforementioned example of 
government-endorsed cartelization in certain countries is an apt illustration. The 
cartelization policy does not tinker with the degree of competition among firms; 
competition is eliminated altogether. Government-endorsed cartelization is most 
certainly a bad policy from the perspective of competition. There is an 
unassailable case for aligning cultural norms regarding competition beyond this 
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basic level, where such overt stymying of competition is tolerated if not 
encouraged. 
However, once one moves beyond this minimum level of acceptance of 
competition, different cultures may understandably and legitimately differ on 
whether competition is to be maximized to the extent possible. While it is easy 
to agree that a complete displacement of competition is detrimental, the 
consensus breaks down once the question turns into one of degree. In particular, 
divergences arise in abuse of dominance. Here the question is not whether firms 
should be made to compete, but how vigorously they are allowed to compete. 
There are many areas of abuse of dominance, such as exclusive dealing, 
predatory pricing, and unilateral refusal to deal, that require difficult judgment 
calls. In particular, in calibrating the stringency of the legal standards for these 
practices, a jurisdiction will need to decide whether it prefers to err on the side 
of encouraging competition at the risk of under-protecting smaller firms from 
exclusionary conduct or on the side of over-protection of smaller firms at the 
risk of stifling competition and indulging inefficient firms. How this balance is 
struck is, to some extent, dependent on the prevalent cultural beliefs about 
competition in a given jurisdiction. Attempts to foster normative convergence 
by enforcing a common set of substantive rules across countries will be 
counterproductive. Such a project risks creating such a sharp divide between 
legal rules and cultural norms that it will undermine the legitimacy of the entire 
competition law enterprise in the eyes of the general public. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION  
In light of the myriad divergences among jurisdictions, or even within 
individual jurisdictions, on some of the fundamental aspects of competition law, 
such as the range and meaning of its policy goals, the state of economic 
development and differences in how markets function, and cultural norms about 
competition, it is unlikely that deep convergence encompassing procedural, 
substantive, and normative aspects of competition law will be attainable over the 
short term. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that this Article does not 
suggest a wholesale repudiation of the convergence project. Convergence has, 
no doubt, improved the quality of enforcement in the emerging jurisdictions. 
Much useful knowledge and expertise has been transferred through capacity 
building and technical assistance programs to emerging jurisdictions. It has 
brought about a more sophisticated understanding and use of economic 
concepts in competition law analysis, focusing on the effects rather than the 
form of business conduct. This is an encouraging development. 
This Article adds to the existing literature on convergence by questioning 
the facile assumption that a universally applicable set of competition law 
principles exists and should be followed across the globe. This Article has 
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hopefully illustrated that such an assumption is highly questionable. Competition 
law principles and doctrines must be fashioned and applied with an acute 
awareness of the local economic and socio-cultural environment. The lack of 
experience and expertise of most emerging jurisdictions in fact places a greater 
responsibility on established jurisdictions and international organizations to 
exercise care when forging and formulating an international consensus. 
Recommendations and best practices need to be prepared with their target 
audience in mind. The consensus builders must be aware that what has worked 
in their jurisdictions may not achieve the same results in other jurisdictions. If 
possible, caveats should be incorporated in the consensus documents so that 
emerging jurisdictions are aware of possible grounds for divergent practices. If 
that proves impossible, the onus falls on the officials involved in technical 
assistance programs to familiarize themselves with the recipient jurisdiction’s 
economic and socio-cultural environment and to assist local officials in 
identifying needs for possible local adaptations. Only then will we achieve 
sensible convergence, one that reduces global divergences of competition law 
without neglecting local circumstances. 
